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A Critique of Instrumental Rationality:
Judicial Reasoning About the "Cold
Numbers" in Hopwood v. Texas
Tomiko Brown-Nagin*
It is we who use words
As screens for thoughts
And weave dark garments
To cover the naked body
Of the too white Truth




While African-Americans' rate of enrollment in institutions of
higher education is at an all-time high nationally,2 admissions of
Blacks and Latinos to Texas' most prestigious universities have
dropped dramatically. 3 At the University of Texas Law School,
minority admissions plummeted eighty-five percent in the 1996-97
academic year, while minority admissions were down twenty
percent at the undergraduate school.4 Of the eleven African-
American students admitted to the law school for the 1997-98
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Faulcon, David Sullivan, Willie J. & Lillie C. Brown and Daniel Nagin.
1. Langston Hughes, Liars, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES
44, 44 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds., 1994).
2. See A. Phillips Brooks, Rival States Lure Minority Students, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Mar. 16, 1997, at B12.
3. See Peter Applebome, Universities Report Less Minority Interest After Ac-
tion to Ban Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at B1.
4. See Charles Krauthammer, Race and Classrooms, WASH. POST, May 23,
1997, at A29.
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school year, only one had accepted admission for the fall term. 5
Subsequently, that lone student declined enrollment, although
four Blacks and twenty-five Latinos eventually enrolled for the
academic year. 6  In previous years, thirty to forty African-
American and Latino students typically enrolled annually at
Texas' flagship law school.7 In fact, the University of Texas has
produced more minority attorneys than any other law school in the
country.8 In light of the University's former role in cultivating
African-American and Latino lawyers, the recent decline in
minority admissions to the law school is a sobering reality, indeed.
The current state of affairs at the University of Texas is the
legacy of Hopwood v. Texas.9 In Hopwood the Fifth Circuit found
the University of Texas Law School's affirmative action policy
unconstitutional and enjoined future consideration of race as a
factor in the school's admissions process.10  Predictably, the
Hopwood decision has created or reinforced a perception among
students of Color that the law school is hostile to them,
contributing to the decline in applications from African-American
and Latino students." The school's admissions program is the
primary reason for the denial of access to these students,
however. 12 Admission to the law school is dependent to a great
extent upon the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)-a
standardized test that commonly is known to obstruct access of
racial minorities to legal education-but that is used extensively
by universities for judging applicants, nevertheless. 13 Hopwood
prevents admissions officials from using affirmative action policies
5. See Hopwood Aftermath: Texas Must Find Ways to Boost Minority Enroll-
ment, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 1, 1997, at 2J [hereinafter Hopwood After-
math].
6. See Alice McKenzie, Lone Black Law Enrollee Withdraws: Media Scrutiny
at UT Cited in His Decision, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 1A; Lydia
Lum, The Hopwood Effect, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 25, 1997, at Al. (At press time,
the University of Texas Law School had not responded to the author to verify pre-
cisely the number of Blacks and Latinos who actually matriculated in 1997-98.)
7. See S.C. Gwynne, Back to the Future: Forced to Scuttle Affirmative Action,
Law Schools See Minority Enrollment Plummet to 1963 Levels, TIME, June 2, 1997,
at 48.
8. See id.
9. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
10. See id. at 934-35.
11. See McKenzie, supra note 6, at 1A.
12. See Eulius Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost
Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 360 (1987) ('The
primary reason for this underrepresentation [of Blacks in the legal profession] is
attributable to current admission practices, and particularly to the heavy empha-
sis on the LSAT.").
13. See id. at 359-67.
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to mitigate the disparate racial impact of heavy reliance on LSAT
scores. Thus, its foreseeable result has been to limit greatly the
number of African-Americans and Latinos able to enroll at the
University of Texas Law School.14
The loss of African-American and Latino lawyers that is oc-
curring as a result of the Hopwood decision is significant for many
reasons. That the law school at the University of Texas would give
rise to both Sweatt v. Painter15 and Hopwood is remarkable. 16 The
significance of Hopwood extends beyond this historical paradox,
however: the loss of African-American and Latino lawyers that
will result from the decision suggests the significant role that the
case will play in redefining racial status relationships. Because
lawyers occupy positions of power and prestige in our society, it
follows that the maldistribution of lawyers among racial groups
perpetuates race-based and socioeconomic inequalities. 17
For this reason Hopwood invites a discussion about the integ-
rity of the processes that have produced the present uneven distri-
bution of educational and employment opportunities in our society,
and an examination of the ways in which courts reason about
these processes. This Article criticizes the mode of reasoning em-
ployed by the Fifth Circuit in reaching its outcome in Hopwood. I
characterize the analytical posture embraced by the court as defi-
cient--even irresponsible. This conclusion rests on my evaluation
of the court's treatment of an issue that is salient to all cases in
which affirmative action policies in higher education are attacked,
but which is conspicuous in the Hopwood opinion: judicial rea-
14. See id. at 360; Hopwood Aftermath, supra note 5, at 2J.
15. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding segregated educational opportunities offered to
African-American students unequal to those offered to Whites and therefore, un-
constitutional). For a discussion of the legal history of Sweatt and its critical role
in the NAACP's legal strategy to attain equal opportunity for African-Americans in
education, see MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 128-29, 131-33, 134-36,
140-47 (1994); Douglas L. Jones, The Sweatt Case and the Development of Legal
Education for Negroes in Texas, 47 TExAS L. REV. 677, 677-93 (1969).
16. This uncanny historical discontinuity has generated somber commentary
from numerous observers. See, e.g., Constance Baker Motley, Remarks at the
Thurgood Marshall Commemorative Luncheon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 531, 541 (1996)
("It is pure, unadulterated irony that the University of Texas Law School, whose
institutional segregation was felled by Marshall ... should be the institution[ ] in-
volved in these anti-affirmative action decisions."); Anthony Lewis, Enrollment
Crisis: Hopwood Decision Is Eliminating Diversity on Campus, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 27, 1997, at 13A (quoting a University of Texas law professor's ques-
tion, "What is it going to be like teaching Brown v. Board of Education with no
blacks in the classroom?").
17. See David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?: The Role of Legal
Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1981, 1984, 1986-88 (1993).
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soning about an individual's just deserts 5 in the admissions proc-
ess. Specifically, I refer to the relationship between the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reasoning about an individual's entitlement to education at
the University of Texas Law School as a matter of constitutional
law, as compared to her entitlement to education as determined by
the quantitative criteria used to evaluate applicants in the law
school admissions process. The court conflates these two concepts
of desert, inappropriately making the latter a proxy for or precon-
dition to the former.
The importance of the racial gap in admissions indices to the
Hopwood court's reasoning about the constitutional issues pre-
sented in the case is a striking feature of the opinion. 19 The deci-
sion clearly rests in part upon normative judgments about the em-
pirical data used in the Texas Index ("TI"). 20 Yet, the court failed
to openly and honestly rationalize its judgments about this data-
"these cold numbers." 2' The unacceptable consequence of these
maneuvers is that the court failed to justify the influence on its
constitutional analysis of the measurement of legal aptitude em-
bodied by the TI. Such evasion and obfuscation are inappropriate
to an opinion written by a federal appellate court, especially one
that boldly breaks with long-established precedent-indeed, to the
18. By referring to the concept of desert, I mean to invoke the dichotomous no-
tion of rewards and penalties, victims and perpetrators, that is an ultimate value
inherent in many areas of law, including tort and criminal law. See GEORGE F.
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 96 (1996). For the purposes of
this Article, I note that "desert" is especially relevant to the constitutional regime
that addresses issues of racial discrimination, most famously in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and ensuing school desegregation efforts that were
justified in terms of "corrective justice." See Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transi-
tion: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 731-36
(1986) (explaining the corrective theory of justice).
19. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935-38 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
20. The TI is the composite of scores used by the University of Texas in its law
school admissions program. See id. at 935. During the period relevant to Hop-
wood, the LSAT score constituted 60% of the composite, while the undergraduate
grade point average constituted 40% of the admissions index. See id. at 935 n. 1.
21. Id. at 936. The court began its discussion with the statement that
"[n]umbers are paramount for admission [to the Texas law school]." Id. at 935. It
listed the relevant TI composites for admitted applicants as the following: 3.56
GPAI164 LSAT for Whites; 3.30/158 for African-Americans; and 3.24/157 for Mexi-
can-Americans. See id. at 936-37, 937 n.7. The court then opined that the score
differentials between White and non-White applicants-which it termed "these
cold numbers"-were "striking" and "dramatic," such that the numbers demon-
strated the lower ability of African-American and Mexican-American students at
the University of Texas Law School. See id. at 934-36, 936 n.5, 937 n.7. After de-
scribing the relevant "cold numbers," the opinion assumed an analytical posture
that pitted putatively high scoring Whites versus lower scoring students of Color.
See id. at 937-38.
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point of purporting to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke.22
This Article takes issue with the court's treatment of the "cold
numbers" by arguing its inconsistency with doctrinal conventions
established in certain education and employment cases, as well as
in other relevant areas.23 The Article also challenges the court's
reasoning on prudential grounds.24 I aspire to bridge the gap cre-
ated in the legal literature by the extremist positions customarily
taken by mainstream scholars on the empirical issues underlying
litigation challenging affirmative action programs: namely, liberal
resignation to and conservative valoration of quantitative method-
ologies. 25
In rendering this critique, my agenda is not, however, to dis-
credit the Hopwood court's affinity for quantitative data or its at-
tention to the concept of desert. Although this Article presupposes
that legal thought and knowledge are socially constructed, my per-
spective is neither that truth, as in one's true intellectual ability,
can never be known or measured, nor that quantificative method-
ologies are inherently subordinating. 26 The claims made in this
22. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (upholding the use of race as a factor in considering the
admission of applicants to schools of higher education). The Hopwood court's
treatment of Bakke is discussed infra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 139-157 and accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 230-259.
25. Many influential liberal scholars appear to have resigned themselves to the
inevitability of standardized measurements of ability and their disparate impact
on African-American and Latino students. See, e.g., Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 857 & nn.5-6 (1995)
(assuming that LSAT score and grade point average are good predictors of the le-
gal aptitude of minority students). Taking advantage of the failure of mainstream
liberals to consider seriously real racial differences in applicants' performance on
standardized tests, scholars on the right have seized upon the racial disparity as
incontrovertible proof that African-Americans and Latinos simply do not belong in
competitive universities alongside Whites. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v.
Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 79, 82 (1995) ("The dilemma of affirmative action programs in higher educa-
tion is that what brings them into being-the inability of blacks (and Mexican-
Americans) to compete academically with whites-also guarantees that they can-
not succeed. The central fact about which all else turns is the very large gap (15 to
18 points) that exists between blacks and whites on standard tests of academic ap-
titude or achievement.").
26. That is, this Article is not written deliberately from a post-modernist orien-
tation, the school of thought generally associated with the critique of Enlighten-
ment concepts (such as reason and objectivity), the methodologies that these uni-
versal categories extol (for example, empiricism), and the institutions that support
them. See JEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (1984) (explaining this theoretical tradition); see also VALERIE
KERRUISH, JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY (1991) (explaining ways that social expe-
riences mediate and influence legal thought, practice and methodologies); Mark
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Article transcend ideology, including one's position on affirmative
action in higher education. This is true because this Article re-
veals the irresponsibility of the Hopwood court's approach to racial
differences in applicants' TIs by demonstrating that it is unjusti-
fiably uncritical under any conventional standard of reasonable-
ness.27 The court's dereliction of its obligation to be judicious is a
fault that all reasonable minds should agree is a deeply troubling
characteristic among the judiciary, regardless of ideological pro-
clivity. For the Hopwood court's uncritical perspective on the
quantitative data makes its opinion intellectually dishonest, un-
dercutting the legitimacy of the court's reasoning.
Nevertheless, this Article does not proceed from the assump-
tion that the Hopwood court's faulty reasoning resulted from bad
faith. Rather, it suggests the influence of a facially neutral and
seemingly benign construct on the court's reasoning: the credibil-
ity that the vast majority of lay people rather thoughtlessly attach
to science, particularly scientific conceptions of ability. 28 In the
Hopwood opinion, the belief in the integrity of science is exempli-
fied by the court's response to the TI. In considering the signifi-
cance of this index, the court fails to be mindful of the reality that
"[a] scientific fact may be reliable and accurate .... but inferences
made from it may be confusing or seriously misleading."29 This
proves to be a fatal defect, ultimately making the opinion rhetori-
cally unpersuasive and of dubious value as a paradigm of coherent
legal reasoning.
This Article's discussion proceeds in this way. Part I demon-
strates the importance of quantitative conceptions of ability to the
Hopwood opinion.30 Part II suggests why the court's manner of
reasoning about the "cold numbers" reflects a rigid, instrumental
rationality that is inappropriate to the task of analyzing questions
about the distribution of educational resources in our society. 31
Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 337-47 (1983-84) (implying that empiri-
cism is inherently conservative from a critical studies perspective); Susan Sturm &
Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956 (1996) (arguing that affirmative action supplements
arbitrary and exclusionary admissions procedures from the critical theory perspec-
tive and calling for a fundamental critique of the existing selection processes by
proponents).
27. See infra notes 138-190 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 39-105 and accompanying text.
29. KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1997).
30. See infra notes 39-69 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
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Part III discusses three considerations that should have been
deemed important to a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the
facts presented in Hopwood, but which are either disregarded or
downplayed in the Fifth Circuit's opinion. 32 First, is a considera-
tion of historical issues.33 Second, the Article considers the signifi-
cance of the court's disregard of case law concerning validation of
ability tests that result in the denial of educational and employ-
ment opportunities on the basis of race.34 Finally, I discuss the in-
consistency of the court's approach to the TI with preexisting law
concerning judges' obligations in evaluating expert scientific tes-
timony. 35
Part IV discusses how the court's flawed analytical approach
constrains its constitutional analysis of the compensatory and di-
versity rationales proffered by officials at the University of Texas
Law School in defense of the school's affirmative action program.3 6
Part V suggests legal and policy implications raised by the Fifth
Circuit's analysis of the issues presented in Hopwood.37 Having
criticized the court's approach to the facts in that case as deficient,
the Article concludes by suggesting a functional modality of rea-
soning about educational affirmative action. 38 This functional ap-
proach is more appropriate to the complex socioeconomic issues
that animate concerns about the distribution of knowledge in the
Information Age than the instrumentalism characterizing the
Hopwood opinion.
I. Hopwood as Scientific Determinism
The use of science in the courtroom raises two issues that
seem different but are in fact related at a deeper level: scientific
uncertainty and misuse of science. 39 This is not to say that "truth"
is relative, as a pernicious kind of postmodernism maintains.4 0
Rather, it is to say that science has limited ability to answer ques-
tions of great social importance. 41
32. See infra notes 106-190 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 110-137 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 138-157 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 158-190 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 191-229 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 230-259 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 230-259 and accompanying text.
39. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 29, at 16.
40. See id. at 17.
41. See id.
Law and Inequality
This Part demonstrates the salience of the putatively scien-
tific measurement of ability embodied in the TI to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Hopwood---or the court's uncritical embrace of
quantitative methodologies. Noting the emphasis placed upon the
"cold numbers" in the first pages of the decision, this Part argues
that the rhetorical structure of the Hopwood opinion strongly sug-
gests the significance that quantitative conceptions of ability held
in the court's reasoning about the appropriate outcome in the
case. 42 These initial passages leave the reader with a clear under-
standing that the court presumes the "cold numbers" of the TI to
represent an applicant's just deserts in the admissions process,
and therefore, that the affirmative action program, which under-
mines the natural progress of desert, is unfair and unconstitu-
tional.43
A. The Rhetorical Structuring of Hopwood Around the "Cold
Numbers"
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood v. Texas begins in a
striking manner. The scores comprising the TI, the statistical in-
dex used by the University of Texas in law school admissions,44 are
among the facts mentioned by the court in the very first para-
graphs of its opinion.45
The court's placement of its discussion of "cold numbers" at
the very beginning of the opinion is quite significant in terms of
the text's overall rhetorical structure. This prominent placement
suggests that the court's reasoning about the appropriateness of
affirmative action at Texas's law school is influenced to a large ex-
tent by the empirical data embodied in the TI. Moreover, this rhe-
torical construction seems designed to make the court's subsequent
language against affirmative action at the law school flow logically
from the discussion of the difference in "cold numbers" between
White applicants and applicants of Color. The initial emphasis
upon the race-based differentials in TIs also makes the Fifth Cir-
cuit's anti-affirmative action decision seem a humane gesture on
behalf of low-scoring-and therefore misplaced-African-American
and Latino applicants.
42. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2580 (1996).
43. See id.
44. See supra notes 20-21 (explaining the TI).
45. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
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These effects are achieved by way of a kind of syllogism that
is located in the first few pages of the opinion. That is, the court
tells a story about the meaning of the "cold numbers" in three rhe-
torical steps placed in the opinion's opening paragraph.
The first proposition in the syllogism is the claim that the law
school at the University of Texas is "one of the nation's leading law
schools."46 And that because of its greatness, the law school re-
ceives over 4,000 applications annually for admission to an enter-
ing class of only about 500.47
After extolling the quality of the law school, the court reveals
that many of these 4,000 applicants "have some of the highest
grades and test scores in the country."48 This fact is the second
part of the proof. The last sentence in the first paragraph frames
the Hopwood opinion. It links the "cold numbers" to the intellec-
tual ability of White applicants, and thereby, to the greatness of
the law school.
The final proposition in the syllogism confirms the signifi-
cance of the "cold numbers," and thereby the value of high scoring
Whites, in the law school's admissions process. The court claims
that because of the two propositions stated above, "numbers are
therefore paramount for admission" to the University of Texas
Law School. 49
The sense of the court's normative and empirical commitment
to the value of the "cold numbers" is underscored by the structural
move that the opinion makes following the court's pronouncement
that numbers are paramount in admissions to the University of
Texas Law School. Soon after making this claim, the court notes
that "Blacks and Mexican Americans were treated differently from
other [White] candidates" in admissions. 50  TI ranges were






50. Id. at 936.
51. Since Asian-Americans often score higher than Whites on standardized
measures of achievement, it is quite significant that the court excludes Asians
from its analysis of minority/White differences in applicants' TI scores. See
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON 10 (1997); see also
Selena Dong, "Too Many Asians" The Challenge of Fighting Discrimination
Against Asian-Americans and Preserving Affirmative Action, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1027, 1057 n.4 (noting that "in 1990, Asian-Americans constituted only 2.9% of the
national population, but represented 20%, 15%, and 24% respectively of the first-
year classes entering Harvard, Yale, and Stanford, and outnumbered whites at
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The court fails to note that it is not impossible-in fact it is
likely-that some African-Americans and Latinos were among the
high-scoring applicants. The Law School Admission Council re-
ports that more than 3% of the 8,273 African-American law school
applicants who took the LSAT in 1996-97 and more than 7% of the
5,770 Latinos who took the test that year received scores of 160
and above on the LSAT-which means that they scored higher
than roughly 85% of all applicants applying to law school in that
year, including Whites. 52  A significant number of African-
American (68) and Latino (166) applicants received very high
scores-between 165 and a perfect score of 180-meaning that
they scored higher than over ninety percent of all applicants. 53
These high-scoring applicants, about eleven percent of African-
Americans and Latinos who applied to law school in 1996-97, logi-
cally would have applied to the most selective programs. Thus, we
can infer that some of these applicants applied to Texas' flagship
law school, at which the median LSAT score of accepted students
was 162 in the class entering in 1996. 54
both the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses of the University of California").
However, without the exclusion of Asian-Americans' scores, the court's claims con-
cerning the singular harm to Whites of affirmative action for African-Americans
and Latinos would have been undermined. That is, if the TI scores of Asian-
American applicants tended to be higher than those of Whites, the court's under-
standing of who "steals" law school seats from deserving Whites would have been
destabilized.
52. Telephone Interview with Robert Carr, Director of Data Services, Law
School Admissions Council (Feb. 4, 1998). Students identifying themselves as
Mexican-American/Chicano, Hispanic/Latino and Puerto Rican comprise the group
termed "Latinos." See id.
53. See id. It is important to note that this pattern of high-scoring Blacks and
Latinos holds for performance on the Scholastic Admissions Test, upon which uni-
versities rely heavily in the undergraduate admissions process. See THE COLLEGE
BOARD, 1997 PROFILE OF COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS 9 (1997). Seven percent of
Black women and 7% of Black men who took the SAT I Verbal scored well above
average (between 600-800 on a scale of 200-800). See id. On the math portion of
the test, 7% of African-American men and 3% of African-American women scored
well above average. See id.
To the detriment of individual high-scoring African-Americans and Latinos,
the focus of the literature is on the lower-than-average performance of African-
Americans and Latinos as a group, as compared to Whites as a group, on stan-
dardized tests. The result of this narrow focus is that the achievement of these
high-scoring minorities is ignored. The stereotyping of African-Americans and La-
tinos as low scorers is significant, as it is known to have an adverse effect on their
performance on standardized tests. See generally Claude Steele, A Threat in the
Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AMER.
PSYCH. 613 (1997) (arguing that stereotypes of women and African-Americans
negatively affect their performance on standardized tests).
54. See Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD. REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at
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The structure of the Hopwood opinion does not, however, al-
low for a consideration of students who are outliers in the race-
based TI hierarchy that the opinion depicts (based on the average
performance of these groups). Acknowledgment of high-scoring
African-Americans and Latinos would undercut the court's judg-
ment that students of Color are simply less qualified for study at
the Texas law school than White applicants. The court makes this
judgment in the last sections of the first part of the opinion when
it suggests that less qualified African-Americans and Latinos sys-
tematically hinder the admission of more qualified Whites to the
University of Texas Law School.55 In a rather backhanded fashion
(a footnote), the court explicitly suggests that in 1992 favored mi-
nority students took law school seats from hundreds of presumably
more deserving White applicants. 56
The opinion describes the Hopwood plaintiffs, in particular,
as deserving students displaced by less-qualified African-
Americans and Latinos.57 The court suggests, for example, that
had Cheryl Hopwood been a member of one of the favored minority
groups, she undoubtedly would have been admitted to the law
school based on her "cold numbers." 58  By describing the four
White plaintiffs' fates in the admissions process in terms of minor-
ity students (e.g., "If she were Black,"), 59 the opinion does not ac-
tually scrutinize the White plaintiffs' credentials. 60 For example,
55. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937-38.
56. See id. at 937 n.9 ("According to the plaintiffs, 600-700 higher-scoring white
residents were passed over before the first blacks were denied admission.").
57. See id.
58. Id. at 937 n.8, 938. The court's theory about the relationship among Hop-
wood's scores, her race and the possibility of admission is curious, as it reveals a
certain race myopia. Had Cheryl Hopwood been African-American or Hispanic in
reality, it is likely that she would not have gotten the same LSAT score. Instead,
she would have achieved a score consistent with the well-documented pattern re-
vealing that African-Americans and Latinos are systematically disadvantaged by
use of the LSAT in law school admissions. Thus, barring some policy of correcting
for this disparate impact, "Black Cheryl" would not have been admitted to the
University of Texas Law School.
59. Id. at 937 n.8.
60. In contrast to the approach of the Hopwood court, other courts have not
framed their discussions of the constitutional issues presented around the aca-
demic superiority of White plaintiffs versus the inferiority of minority students-
even while noting a significant difference between White and non-White students'
quantitatively measured credentials. This is true even in cases where a court or
individual members of a court have found affirmative action programs unlawful.
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-78 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (describing the special admissions program, Bakke's high scores
and "significantly lower" scores of many minority admittees without making a
normative judgment about the merit of two classes of students); id. at 321 (Powell,
J., app. to plurality opinion) (noting that the number of applicants to Harvard
Law and Inequality
the fact that Cheryl Hopwood's high grade point average was
downgraded by admissions officials is mentioned by the court only
in passing.6 1 Nor does the court acknowledge that Hopwood's
scores were higher than 100 Whites who nevertheless were admit-
ted ahead of her-a truly telling omission.
6 2
B. An Alternative Narrative About the "Facts"
Despite the opinion's assured tone, its conclusion about the
preeminence of "cold numbers" in the law school admissions proc-
ess at Texas, or any other institution for that matter, is not inevi-
table. Rather, it is an assumption that is questionable empirically,
as well as normatively. Just a few examples can illustrate the
court's leap in logic.
As an empirical matter, it does not necessarily follow that
numbers dominate a law school admissions process simply because
certain quantifications purporting to be a proxy for ability happen
to be reviewed by admissions committees. Nor can one reasonably
reach the Hopwood court's conclusion simply because many or
most applicants to a prestigious and competitive school have at-
tained high scores. Consider the following hypotheticals that call
into question the court's unyielding conclusion. A school could
simply acknowledge applicants' scores but not establish any kind
College deemed not "qualified" is "comparatively small" and that the College has
never relied upon a single criterion of "scholarly excellence" in its admissions deci-
sions); id. at 325-49, 363-64, 364 n.37, 377 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (framing his opinion around the history of dis-
crimination and noting applicability of employment law that requires the use of
"test criteria that fairly reflect the qualifications of minority applicants... even if
this means interpreting the qualifications of the applicant in light of his race");
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (describing both the schol-
arship program open only to African-Americans and the scholarship program open
to all other students as "merit-based" although the two programs had significantly
different scholastic standards for participation); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d
52, 53-57 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting the "excellent academic record" of Podberesky and
the significantly lower minimum requirements for African-American scholarship
recipients, but focusing on the constitutional issue of narrow tailoring), cert. de-
nied 514 U.S. 1128 (1993); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 553-55, 557-58
(W.D.Tex. 1994) (focusing upon the history of discrimination in education against
African-Americans and Latinos, and explaining that the baseline TI has been in-
creased steadily over time due to the administrative convenience of using a num-
ber-based admissions procedure); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1089
(D.Md. 1993) (rejecting Podberesky's proposed minimum criterion for admission
based on the combination of SAT scores and grade point averages because the use
of numbers "ignores the variables in the admissions process and the intergenera-
tional effects of segregated education on the applicant pool"); see also DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 330-32 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the LSAT is a deficient admissions tool).
61. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
62. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 26, at 1036 n.28.
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of numerically fixed admissions index pursuant to which students
were classified as presumptive admits or presumptive denies.
63
Likewise, a school could choose to acknowledge applicants' scores,
but assign values to them such that quantitative factors were not
ever, in fact, the predominant factors in an admissions index.
64
Finally, even if quantifiable variables play a large role in a school's
admissions decisions, this does not necessarily imply the "cold
numbers only" selection process invoked by the Hopwood court.
Many schools acknowledge scores, but many also make decisions
about individual admissions on a case-by-case basis when such in-
dividualized scrutiny is deemed warranted.
65
As a normative matter, a court interpreting facts involving
any one or a combination of the hypothetical admissions processes
described above could reasonably choose not to characterize num-
bers as the predominant factor in admissions. Let us take the in-
tuitively worst case scenario for this Article's argument-the third
one, where a law school's policy is to use an admissions index
which heavily relies upon quantitative variables. Even under such
a system, a court might think it important to take note of the fact
that large numbers of students are not, in reality, admitted solely
or even primarily based on their "cold numbers." These students
might include those in the discretionary zone under an admissions
index system such as the one the University of Texas used: wait-
listed students; foreign students; legacies; children of faculty; stu-
dents from underrepresented locales; religious minorities; disabled
students; White women, and state residents who benefit from a
quota when applying to publicly supported educational institutions
63. Consider the following explanation of admissions standards to a leading
law school:
Admission is based on our estimate of the applicant's potential for aca-
demic excellence. We make this judgment upon the totality of information
available; no one item, such as LSAT score, grades, or letters of recom-
mendation, is conclusive .... There is no cut-off point for grade-point av-
erage or LSAT score below which an applicant is not considered.
YALE LAW SCHOOL, APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION 8 (1997).
64. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST:
SOURCES, CONTENTS, USES 16 (1991) (noting that some law schools "assign par-
ticular weights... to each of the two predictors[, LSAT and UGPA,] for their own
policy reasons").
65. Interestingly, although the court characterizes the TI system as one in
which the "cold numbers" are paramount, its opinion acknowledges that, in fact,
the TI system operates in a much less rigid way than this characterization sug-
gests. See, e.g., Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935 (stating that admissions officers
"necessarily exercised judgment in interpreting the individual scores of applicants"
and "considered what qualities each applicant might bring to his law school class").
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in their state. 66 These are just a few categories of individuals who
may be admitted to law school based in part upon qualities other
than their numbers.
A court might refer to a system in which admissions deci-
sions are based putatively on the numbers but where, in fact, a
more ambiguous process operates as a "mixed" system. In a mixed
admissions process two tiers of applicants exist: presumptive ad-
mits and those who are not presumptive admits. Since most ad-
missions programs, including that operated by the University of
Texas, probably consist of these two large classes of students, it is
very appropriate to suggest that most law school admissions proc-
esses are mixed in nature vis-d-vis quantitative and non-
quantitative criteria. 67 In fact, this would seem the most impartial
manner in which to characterize most law school admissions proc-
esses.
The court's conclusion about the preeminence of the numbers
in the University of Texas Law School's admissions process is both
an empirical and a normative claim about the way in which the
school makes admissions decisions. As to the empirical claim, the
court does not critically assess the way in which the university in
fact admits the majority of its law school class-that is, all of
whom are not presumptive admits-in the way that I have sug-
gested in the hypotheticals above. Rather, it accepts as empirical
fact the credibility of the TI as a proxy for merit and that Texas
rigidly applies this quantitative standard in its admissions deci-
sions--except in the case of African-Americans and Latinos.68
Thus the opinion's coherence is predicated upon a boldly stated as-
sumption about the value of data that goes unchallenged: While
praising the cold numbers as extremely valuable, the opinion com-
pletely ignores questions about whether this data is reliable and
accurate, or about how it is interpreted and used by admissions of-
ficials at the University of Texas Law School. Certainly these
questions were relevant to the case. They relate directly to the in-
66. The Hopwood plaintiffs benefited from an enormous legislatively mandated
quota for state residents at the University of Texas Law School. See id. at 935 n.2.
In 1992, the quota was set at 85% (i.e., only 15% of the entering class could be non-
residents). See id. The court noted that "residency ... had a strong, if not often
determinate, effect" on admissions for applicants whose academic records were not
the most impressive. Id. And yet, the court found this immense quota insignifi-
cant to reasoning about the Hopwood litigation. See id.
67. See supra note 60 (noting that courts other than Hopwood have addressed
affirmative action issues without labeling White students as superior and minority
students as inferior); supra notes 63-66 (describing the admissions processes of
some law schools).
68. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
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tegrity of the data that the court finds indicative of an applicant's
just deserts in the admissions process, and by extension, to the
court's assessment of the fairness of the law school's affirmative
action program.
As to the normative significance of the court's empirical
findings, the prominent placement of the discussion of the num-
bers and the tone of that discussion-particularly the allusion to
the TI as "cold numbers"69-strongly suggest that the court some-
how approves of the law school's heavy reliance upon quantifica-
tions as proxies for an applicant's just desserts in the admissions
process. Had the court simply introduced the concept of the TI in
the first part of its opinion or discussed the index in an equivocal
way, this Article's argument about its normative commitment to
the credibility of these scores would be less persuasive. The court's
discussion of the applicants' scores, however, was not in any way
ambivalent. The Fifth Circuit discussed the index in a way that
created the binary opposition of high-scoring Whites versus low-
scoring "Blacks/Mexicans." The court made the supposed dispar-
ity in scores between these two classes of students seem central to
one's conception of the scenario presented in Hopwood, if not the
appropriate result in the case per se.
II. The Instrumental Nature of the Court's Analytical
Approach
The previous Part suggested ways in which the structure of
the Hopwood opinion implies the salience of quantitative meas-
urements of ability in the Fifth Circuit's decision making process.
The prominent position occupied by the empirical data in the
opinion's structure is not meaningful alone, however. As this Arti-
cle began to explain immediately above, the Fifth Circuit does not
merely make mention of the TI at the beginning of the Hopwood
opinion, but attaches normative significance to it. In claiming that
White applicants to the law school's class of 1992 had "some of the
highest grades and test scores in the country" 70 and that the score
differential between these applicants and applicants of Color was
"striking" and "dramatic,"71 the court revealed two crucial norma-
tive judgments. First, it divulged its judgment that a clear rela-
tionship exists between the "cold numbers" of the TI and a stu-
dent's qualification for study at the University of Texas Law
69. See supra Part L.A.
70. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
71. Id. at 936.
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School.72 Though left unstated, a second judgment follows from
the first: that the TI would not be viewed in a critical light. Its
reliability as a proxy for an applicant's aptitude for law school
would go unquestioned.
The practical effect of these normative positions was to pre-
dispose the court to instrumental reasoning about the facts in
Hopwood. The court's apparent belief in the salience of the mi-
nority/White TI difference influenced it to view the facts of the
case through the prism of the stereotypical assumptions about the
intellectual ability of African-Americans and Latinos, rather than
in terms of each group's constitutional entitlement per se, or lack
of entitlement per se, to a certain distribution of law school seats,
or to general socioeconomic wellness. In this way, the court was
predisposed to a dim view of the law school's race-conscious admis-
sions policy and a finding of unconstitutionality.
This Part explores why the court may have been so per-
suaded by the TI. 73 I do not proceed from the assumption that the
court's reasoning resulted from bad faith of any kind. Rather, the
discussion in this section is meant to shed light upon the power
and pervasiveness of scientific conceptions of ability in our culture,
including in legal norms and reasoning.
A. The "Cold Numbers" as Science
Credibility often is automatically afforded to things that bear
the imprimatur of science.7 4 Credibility inheres in the scientific
for good reason. Without expertise to critique scientific develop-
ments for themselves, most people are comfortable only appreci-
ating, rather than criticizing, the ways that science and technology
have radically changed our society over time.75
72. See id.
73. See infra notes 74-105 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, The Science Wars, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 21, 1997, at
54-56 (describing how "society is driven by science," by explaining that ordinary
people depend upon scientists to answer important questions about heritability of
diseases and merits of using IQ scores for assignment of children to classrooms);
Daniel Callahan, Calling Scientific Ideology to Account, SOCIETY, May-June 1996,
at 14-19 (describing how "[s]cience came almost totally to win the minds and emo-
tions of educated Americans" during the 1970s and 1980s, and stating that faith in
science remains ascendant in the cultural landscape).
75. See, e.g., Steven Epstein, Public Understandings, 274 AMER. ASSOC. ADV.
OF SCIENCE 732 (1996) (stating that laypeople view science with "respect, fear, and
utter incomprehension") (reviewing CHRISTOPHER P. TOUMEY, CONJURING
SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC SYMBOLS AND CULTURAL MEANINGS IN AMERICAN LIFE
(1996)).
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Mathematics epitomizes the scientific method.76 Mathemati-
cal formulas-with their neat axioms and theorems-imply cer-
tainty and "naturalness."77 A mathematical proof is either consid-
ered valid or it is not. Thus, mathematical concepts seem different
in kind from, say, historical narratives, the putative facts of which
are commonly thought subject to interpretation and manipulation
from one expert to the next.78 Add to the seeming objectivity of
mathematics its abstruseness. The practical significance of these
realities is that society relies upon a small and elite corps of ex-
perts for quantitative truths about the many subjects to which
mathematical analysis is applied.79
In light of the credibility presumptively afforded scientific
concepts in Western culture, the Fifth Circuit's reference to the
"striking" and "dramatic" difference between the TIs of White ap-
plicants and applicants of Color as a material fact is understand-
able. The TI is, after all, none other than a mathematical for-
mula.80 It is a composite that purports to be statistically verified
as a proxy for success in law school.81 As such, the TI is a para-
digmatic representation of a "natural," quantitative truth. It
comes as no surprise, then, that the court would be convinced of
the TI's significance to the Hopwood litigation. I dare say any ra-
tional person with no statistical expertise would be predisposed to
taking the TI for what its expert creators claim it to be-a stu-
dent's aptitude for the study of law.
76. See ROBERT LOPEZ ET AL., CIVILIZATIONS: WESTERN AND WORLD 745 (1975)
(discussing the fundamental place of math in Comte's classification of positive
knowledge); Eike Gebhardt, A Critique of Methodology, in THE ESSENTIAL
FRANKFURT SCHOOL READER 375 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1978)
(analyzing the methodology of science with an eye toward critical theory and phi-
losophy) [hereinafter FRANKFURT READER]. See generally Crispin Wright, Wittgen-
stein on Mathematical Proof, in WITTGENSTEIN CENTENARY ESSAYS 79, 79-99 (A.
Phillips Griffiths ed., 1991) (describing and critiquing the theory of mathematics).
77. See Wright, supra note 76, at 81-82, 98.
78. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY 10-58 (1989)
(discussing changing themes in the historiography of race).
79. See Wright, supra note 76, at 97.
80. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). The court explained that "the formulae for the class en-
tering in 1992 accorded an approximate 60% weight to LSAT scores and 40% to
GPA. The formulae for students with a three-digit LSAT ... was calculated as:
LSAT + (10) (GPA) = TI. For students with a two-digit LSAT, the formula was:
(1.25) LSAT + (10) GPA = TI." Id.
81. The formulae were written and statistically validated for success in the
first year of law school by the Law School Data Assembly Service (LSDAS). See id.
LSDAS found the LSAT to be a better predictor of success in law school than a four
year cumulative grade point average. See id.
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Still, might not a rational and critically thinking mind chal-
lenge the logic of the TI? For instance, one could interrogate the
very idea that the true nature of aptitude for law, or intelligence
generally, can actually be known or accurately measured by stan-
dardized tests.82 Furthermore, even if one believed the TI's quan-
tifications to represent something about a person's abilities during
the first year of law school, one might question why entry to the
legal profession should turn on one's expected performance during
the first year of law school, as if that benchmark represents some-
thing particularly meaningful about legal aptitude over the course
of one's career. One could also be concerned that the TI might be
used in an arbitrary manner. One example of potentially arbitrary
usage is attaching great significance to slight (and perhaps statis-
tically insignificant) differences in scores. The meaning attached
to the slightness in difference between applicants' scores might be
an especially important concern if those who tend to attain scores
on the lower end of the continuum are groups that historically
have been subordinated in the American educational system by
law. In fact, it would seem that the more restrictive a law school's
admissions criteria and the greater the impact of them on these
groups, the better a law school's justification should be for using
certain criteria and admissions cutoffs. In sum, a critical thinker
might ask on what principled basis does an institution that relies
heavily upon a composite such as the TI set minimum require-
ments for admission?
Yes, one might ask these questions. But it is also quite possi-
ble that the rational actor would not question the authority of a
statistical index such as the TI. The Frankfurt School's suggestion
that scientific hegemony undermines critical thinking offers a
compelling explanation for why most people would fail to question
truths about ability that bear the imprimatur of science. 83 These
philosophers believed that scientific-technical rationality engen-
ders a constellation of social values that support the notion that
82. See ADELBERT H. JENKINS, TURNING CORNERS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS 67-86, 101-20 (1995); Simien, supra note 12, at 381-85; Sturm
& Guinier, supra note 26, at 967-80.
83. For representative works of the Frankfurt School's critique of the one di-
mensional reasoning they believed to be engendered by science's stress on ration-
ality and efficiency, see HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN
THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964); Max Horkheimer, Notes
on Science and the Crisis, in CRITICAL THEORY 3-9 (Matthew J. O'Connell et al.
trans., 1972); Herbert Marcuse, On Science and Phenomenology, in FRANKFURT
READER, supra note 76, at 466-76; Herbert Marcuse, Some Social Implications of
Modern Technology, in FRANKFURT READER, supra note 76, at 138-62 [hereinafter
Social Implications].
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society is best understood in scientific terms, or in terms of quanti-
fication.8 4 The result of such scientific cultural hegemony is that
non-scientific or non-quantitative reasoning seems utterly subjec-
tive-making reasoning infused with immeasurable factors or val-
ues (e.g., social justice) seem illegitimate. 85 In a society where sci-
entific norms dominate, raising questions that cast doubt upon the
credibility of a putatively objective statistical composite (such as
the TI) will likely seem unreasonable or even absurd. How does
one explain resistance to statistics, for instance, without resorting
to nonscientific (that is, "subjective") arguments if one is not profi-
cient in the language of the statistician? It is because of such
pressure-the effects of the hegemony of scientific methodologies
upon lay people-that most of us simply defer to scientific knowl-
edge over time. In the case of the use of the TI at the University of
Texas, for example, society has accepted the transformation of
"individual [students'] distinctions in the aptitude, insight, and
knowledge" into "quanta of skill" that are then placed within the
"framework of standardized performances. 86 With continued use
84. Consider two passages from Marcuse's ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN that cap-
ture deftly the notion of scientific-technical rationality enveloping the entire cul-
tural landscape. "As [the positivistic, scientific project] unfolds, it shapes the en-
tire universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the
medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an omnipres-
ent system which swallows up or repulses all alternative .... Technological ra-
tionality has become political rationality." MARCUSE, supra note 83, at xvi.
Marcuse explains how quantitative thinking becomes predominant in society
by explaining how we come to understand the concept of length:
To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical opera-
tions. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by
which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves
as much and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is
determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set
of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of op-
erations.
Id. at 13; accord GEORGE FRIEDMAN, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FRANKFURT SCHOOL 118-19, 121-22 (1981).
85. Again, Marcuse captures why objections to quantitative concepts such as
the TI seem foolish in a society dominated by putatively scientific standardized
testing: "The same de-realization affects all ideas which, by their very nature,
cannot be verified by scientific method. No matter how much they may be recog-
nized, respected, and sanctified, in their own right, they suffer from being non-
objective . . . . Humanitarian, religious, and moral ideas are only 'ideal."'
MARCUSE, supra note 83, at 147-48; accord Social Implications, supra note 83, at
141-43.
86. Social Implications, supra note 83, at 142. Unlike the contemporary stu-
dent, whose academic life is overrun with standardized measurements of progress,
the student of the classical liberal era had great room for intellectual development.
The individual, as a rational being, was deemed capable of finding these
forms [the full development of his abilities] by his own thinking and, once
he had acquired freedom of thought, of pursuing the course of action
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over time, those standardized scores have come to represent truths
about students' abilities, rather than measurements whose mean-
ing is subject to varying interpretations and usages. Nuance is
lost.
The Frankfurt School's emphasis on the top-down manner in
which society is transformed by the hegemony of science is an im-
portant factor that makes their social theory more intuitively com-
pelling: it reassures those of us who are disinclined to accept what
might be perceived as their disbelief in human agency. The School
stressed that the drive toward quantification impacts society first
at the level of institutions, such as the University of Texas Law
School, as opposed to individuals, such as an admissions officer, or
a federal judge.8 7 The lay person dominated by institutional norms
has little choice but to succumb to science-based reasoning about
the intellect.88 Even the most critical thinkers existing within he-
gemonic spaces are vulnerable to accepting scientific measure-
ments that are sanctioned by society's important institutions.
In light of the Frankfurt School's theories, the Fifth Circuit's
structuring of the Hopwood opinion around the TI without any re-
flection upon its credibility does not seem odd, but quite rational.
Precisely because it is quantitative and putatively statistically
validated evidence, the court took the TI for "fact." Its reference to
the TI as the "cold numbers" surely says a mouthful in this regard.
B. Antecedent "Fact": The LSAT as Science
The LSAT's role in inspiring the Fifth Circuit's faith in the TI
should not be underestimated. 89 The assessment of a student's le-
gal aptitude provided by the LSAT score is the single piece of
"evidence" that is most likely to have compelled the court to find
the difference in TI scores between applicants of Color and White
applicants to the University of Texas Law School to be "striking"
which would actualize them. Society's task was to grant him such free-
dom and to remove all restrictions upon his rational course of action.
Id.
87. See Social Implications, supra note 83, at 140.
88. See id. at 140.
89. The undergraduate GPA was also an important element in inspiring confi-
dence in the index. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). However, it is my sense that minimal GPA
differentials do not create a basis in scientific "fact" for asserting that students of
Color are less qualified than Whites. Rather, it is the on-average 100 point LSAT
score difference between White and African-American, Latino and Native Ameri-
can students that is the culprit in the supposed inferiority of African-American and
Latino applicants to law schools. See David Kaye, Searching for Truth About Test-
ing, 90 YALE L.J. 431, 438 (1980) (book review).
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and "dramatic."90 The nature of the LSAT's ostensible measure-
ment of a student's ability is thus of singular import in appreciat-
ing the court's perception of the unfairness created by Texas' af-
firmative action program.
The LSAT score is such a compelling measurement of ability
because it is said to be statistically validated as a proxy for law
school ability in the first year.9 ' Index formulas such as the TI are
based on correlation studies conducted by the Law School Admis-
sion Council (LSAC).92 An LSAC correlation report indicates a
formula that is designed to yield a composite of two variables, the
LSAT and UGPA, that will have the highest linear relationship,
statistically speaking, with actual law school performance as
measured by a student's first year grades. 93 The LSAT and the
admissions composites derived from it are, then, complex statisti-
cal measurements whose integrity as proxies for a student's legal
aptitude is established through detailed psychometric analysis.
94
And thus, the reality that law schools rely upon experts asso-
ciated with the LSAC, a client organization of the LSAT's formula-
tor,95 to establish the LSAT's integrity is a fact whose significance
cannot be understated. The process of collaboration between law
schools and the LSAC from which admissions indexes are derived
means that there effectively is no check-no authoritative second
opinion-about the test's validity. Effectively, one company cre-
ates, administers, and validates a test that has the power to keep a
90. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
91. See, e.g., LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE LSAT 1, 16 (1991)
[hereinafter THE LSAT]; LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL,
WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE
AND LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN 14 (1996) (asserting that the
LSAT predicts lower first-year grades among women than men and that first-year
performance data showing lower grades among women demonstrates the LSAT's
validity); LINDA F. WIGHTMAN & DAVID G. MULLER, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
COUNCIL, AN ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIAL VALIDITY AND DIFFERENTIAL PREDICTION
FOR BLACK, MEXICAN AMERICAN, HISPANIC, AND WHITE LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS 1
(1990) CThe validity data do not support the concern that the LSAT score or the
traditional combination of LSAT score and undergraduate grade-point average are
less valid for any of the minority groups than they are for the white group.").
92. See THE LSAT, supra note 91, at 16.
93. See id.
94. See WIGHTMAN & MULLER, supra note 91, at 1-20 (describing the statistical
methods used to determine the validity of the LSAT).
95. The LSAC is a "client organization" of the Educational Testing Service
(ETS). Kaye, supra note 89, at 433 n.9 (quoting A. NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS, THE
CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS: THE RALPH NADER REPORT ON THE EDU.
CATIONAL TESTING SERVICE (1980)).
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student out of law school or determine which law school she at-
tends. 96
C. The Scientific Value of the LSAT. Partial Truths
Admissions officers have been aware for many years that at
least a few psychometric experts insist that use of the LSAT in
admissions unfairly disadvantages African-Americans, Latinos
and Native Americans,97 and doubly disadvantages women of
Color, given the existence of both race and gender disadvantage in
testing.9 8 At various points since its first administration in 1948,
the LSAT's usefulness and validity have been challenged. 99 The
arguments made against the LSAT are complex. For the purposes
of this Article it suffices to state that some argue that the LSAT is
an inaccurate measure of legal ability-that the test does not
measure what it purports to measure, or measures aptitude less
effectively than is appropriate given the purposes for which LSAT
scores are used. 100
Even as LSAC continues to defend the validity of the LSAT
as to all students, its own correlation studies do not refute the no-
tion that the LSAT may overstate the ability of high-scorers, and
more importantly, understate the ability of low-scorers who are
disproportionately racial minorities. 10' Since the spring of 1979
LSDAS has issued "cautionary policies" in response to "growing
concern about overreliance and other possible abuses by those who
96. Most law schools require applicants to submit LSAT scores and subscribe
to the Law School Data Assembly Service, which standardizes undergraduate aca-
demic records. See LAW SCHOOL DATA ASSEMBLY SERVICE, LSAT/LSDAS REG-
ISTRATION AND INFORMATION BOOK 17 (1998-99).
97. See Robert L. Williams & Horace Mitchell, The Testing Game, in BLACK
PSYCHOLOGY 193-205 (Reginald L. Jones ed., 1991); David M. White, Culturally
Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the Record, 14 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89 (1979); Kaye, supra note 89, at 433-53; see also CHARLES
MURRAY & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (arguing that Blacks have significantly less
cognitive ability than Whites); ALEXANDER THOMAS & SAMUEL SILLEN, RACISM AND
PSYCHIATRY 1-44 (1972) (presenting an historical perspective on the entanglement
of intellectual ability measurements with social determinism and racism).
98. See WIGHTMAN & MULLER, supra note 91, at 11; Katherine Connor & Ellen
J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in Standardized Testing, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 14-37, 17 n.13, 19 nn.19-21 (1992).
99. See WIGHTMAN & MULLER, supra note 91, at 1-3; Kaye, supra note 89, at
432; see also Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U.J.
GENDER & L. 121 (1993) (discussing bias in testing and disclosure laws).
100. See Kaye, supra note 89, at 436.
101. See id. at 443-46.
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use standardized test results in allocating scarce educational op-
portunities and resources."'10 2
One of the latest challenges to the validity of the LSAT was
made in a petition for rehearing en banc in Hopwood. Using evi-
dence provided in the trial record concerning the entering classes
of 1986-88, psychometrist Martin Shapiro argued that the TI
"could reliably predict less than 10% of the variation in first-year
grades for African-American students-whatever its validity for
white students. 103 Dr. Shapiro was a witness for the Thurgood
Marshall Legal Society, a student group at the University of Texas
Law School that was a proposed intervenor in Hopwood. 04 Ulti-
mately, Shapiro's argument was not brought before the court,
however, as the Legal Defense Fund's petition for intervention was
rejected on procedural grounds. 0 5 As explained in Part III, the
significance of the court's failure to hear Shapiro's testimony can-
not be overstated. It may have greatly influenced the outcome in
the case.
III. The Hopwood Court's Disregard of Perspectives and
Precedent Inconsistent with Determinism
The Hopwood court's focus upon the TI affects its analysis in
many ways. This Part emphasizes those that are most consequen-
tial to the outcome reached by the court. The first section of this
Part considers the Hopwood opinion's cursory treatment of histori-
cal issues. 0 6 The second section discusses the meaning of the
Fifth Circuit's failure to contemplate the significance of two cate-
gories of case law to its perception of the TI and its constitutional
review of the University of Texas' affirmative action program. 10 7
This law concerns 1) the obligation of judges to consider expert sci-
102. THE LSAT, supra note 91, at 26. The gist of the cautionary policy is cap-
tured in the following summary statement. "[W]hile LSAT scores serve a useful
purpose in the admissions process, they do not measure, nor are they intended to
measure, all the elements important to success at individual institutions. LSAT
scores must be examined in relation to the total range of information available
about a prospective law student." Id.
103. Petition for Rehearing En Banc for the Thurgood Marshall Legal Society at
4, Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-50569). Dr. Shapiro's
statement appears as an appendix to this Article.
104. See id. at 8.
105. Interview with Penda Hair, Esq., Staff Attorney and Director of the
Washington, D.C. Office, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc. (July 26, 1996); see also
infra notes 178-181 and accompanying text (explaining the court's rationale for
denying admission into evidence of Shapiro's expert testimony).
106. See infra text accompanying notes 110-137.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 138-157.
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entific testimony in cases where such evidence is credible and can
assist in resolution of disputes' 08 and 2) validation of ability tests
that restrict access of protected classes to employment and educa-
tional opportunities. 10 9
A. Undervaluation of Past Discrimination and Historical
Perspective
The Hopwood court's treatment of historical issues is of sin-
gular import: the Supreme Court's antidiscrimination jurispru-
dence has been predicated almost entirely upon this country's his-
tory of race-based discrimination.'10  It is because of this
compelling history of discrimination that previous courts have
sanctioned race-conscious governmental programs designed to
remedy the effects of that history that normally are presumptively
unconstitutional."' Given the prominence of historical considera-
tions to the Court's equal protection doctrine, the Hopwood court's
superficial analysis of Texas' racial history represents a serious
misinterpretation of the stakes at issue in the University of Texas
case.
Paradoxically, the Fifth Circuit's perfunctory approach to the
history of discrimination against African-Americans and Latinos
seems to have been based upon the court's awareness of the mag-
nitude and duration of that history (at least as to the former
group),1 2 The court essentially argues that the historical wrongs
108. See infra text accompanying notes 158-190.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 139-157.
110. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326-79 (1978)
(Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun, JJ., plurality) (justifying the medical
school's affirmative action program on the basis of the nation's history of slavery,
segregation and legislative history of efforts to remedy racial discrimination); see
also ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., 2 THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 581-611 (7th ed.
1991) (describing how antidiscrimination law developed in the twentieth century
on the theory of ensuring equal rights for former slaves and their progeny, in-
cluding judicial endorsement of affirmative action policies as a means of compen-
sating victims for historical effects of discrimination); Gewirtz, supra note 18, at
731-35 (explaining that the "prevailing interpretation" of the Equal Protection
Clause is consistent with the corrective conception of justice in which the purpose
of antidiscrimination laws is to remedy specific instances of historical discrimina-
tion).
111. See Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 731-36; see also GERTRUDE EzoRSKY, RACISM
AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 28-50 (1991). For a discussion of
other rationales in support of affirmative action programs, see Brest & Oshige,
supra note 25, at 862-72.
112. The court denies that there is a cognizable history of discrimination
against Mexican-Americans based on the fact that this group was never subjected
to de jure segregation. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 955 n.50 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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against African-Americans have been too pervasive to justify an
affirmative action program like the one employed by the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School. 113 Rather than grappling with the rele-
vant history, the court proclaims that no "logical stopping point"
could be placed upon such programs given the universal history of
de jure segregation in Texas and other southern states. 114 Claims
for race-based preferences in admissions would be based on "sheer
speculation" if the region's general history of segregation served as
the evidentiary yardstick measuring which students deserve af-
firmative action remedies." 5 Because of its intuition that some
minority applicants would not be able to make "valid" claims of en-
titlement to affirmative action remedies, then, the court discounts
ways in which past educational discrimination may have affected
other pools of minority applicants to the law school. While explic-
itly admitting that past discrimination may have affected the edu-
cational achievement of at least some minority students who might
apply to the university, 116 the Hopwood court chose to diminish the
significance of the entire group's educational history.
Given the court's intuitive approach to assessing the signifi-
cance of history, the Hopwood opinion never considers the rele-
vance per se of past discrimination in education to African-
American and Latino applicant pools. Which is to say, it does not
adhere to the standard mode of reasoning about alleged discrimi-
nation under the constitutional standard. 17 Rather, the bulk of
113. See id. at 950-51.
114. Id. at 950. Citing Wygant v. Board of Education, 476 U.S. 275 (1986), the
court explained its position on the expansiveness of the university's history-based
rationale for affirmative action in law school admissions in this way:
If a state can "remedy" the present effects of past discrimination in its
primary and secondary schools, it also would be allowed to award broad-
based preferences in hiring, government contracts, licensing, and any
other state activity that in some way is affected by the educational at-
tainment of the applicants. This very argument was made in Croson and
rejected.
Id.
115. Id. at 950-53.
116. See, e.g., id. at 951 ("No one disputes that in the past, Texas state actors
have discriminated against some minorities in public schools. In this sense, some
lingering effects of such discrimination is not 'societal,' .... "); id. at 954 ("No one
disputes that Texas has a history of racial discrimination in education."); see also
id. at 947 n.31 ("We recognize that the use of some factors such as economic or
educational background of one's parents may be somewhat correlated with race.").
117. In contrast to the Hopwood court's emphasis on causation and cursory
analysis of the significance of historical discrimination to Black and Latino law
school applicants, the Supreme Court has tended to focus more on the nature and
extent of historic discrimination and its present effects in affirming or overturning
lower courts' findings of liability and determinations about the proper scope of
remedies in race discrimination cases. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
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the opinion's discussion of history posits a strict causation theory
of remediation; within this paradigm, the pivotal historical ques-
tion for the court is whether Texas' elementary and secondary
schools, the University of Texas system at large, or the law school
by itself is the relevant discriminator."18 Citing Wygant v. Board
of Education1 9 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.120 as
authority,12 1 the court finds that the law school itself is the rele-
vant unit of comparison. 122
Having established the law school as the relevant discrimina-
tor, the court swiftly discounts the significance of Sweatt v.
Painter123-the most important precedent to Brown v. Board of
Education.124 Emphasizing the "intangibles" of legal education-
"those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school"125-the Court held in
Sweatt that the University of Texas must admit African-
Americans to its flagship law school on the same terms as
Whites. 126 Thus, Sweatt stands for the proposition that policies re-
serving prestigious professional schools for Whites, while relegat-
ing Blacks to inferior schools, are unacceptable as a matter of law.
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988) (plurality opinion) (finding set-aside program unconstitu-
tional where state could not demonstrate that certain groups of beneficiaries had
experienced discrimination in local industry); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion) (finding preferential treatment against layoffs
unconstitutional where state actor's rationale insufficiently related to present ef-
fects of past discrimination and less intrusive remedy for achieving higher rates of
Black employment had not been adopted); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1976) (finding facially neutral tests having disparate impact on employ-
ment opportunities for Blacks unconstitutional where test was not significantly
related to job performance and White employees historically had been favored by
company).
118. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949-52.
119. 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plurality opinion) (striking down the practice
of protecting minority workers from layoff based in part on the theory that evi-
dence of discrimination was not strong enough to warrant remedial action).
120. 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (striking down the set-aside program based upon
the notion that evidentiary findings did not provide the city with a strong basis in
evidence for remedial action).
121. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 950.
122. See id. at 950-52. In a footnote, the court subsumed language from Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978), suggesting that a more general showing is sufficient. See id.
at 949 n.39.
123. 339 U.S. 629 (1950); see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953 (discussing Sweatt,
339 U.S. 629).
124. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (outlawing segregation in elementary and secondary
public education).
125. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634. Among the intangibles to which the Court re-
ferred were the "reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, posi-
tion and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and pres-
tige." Id.
126. See id. at 635-36.
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The Hopwood court simply chose not to grapple with the implica-
tions of Sweatt-groundbreaking precedent less than fifty years
old. Given the record developed below, however, its rejection of
evidence suggesting that the law school environment remains suf-
fused with the effects of Sweatt-era discrimination seems errone-
ous.
1 27
At the same time that it downplays the significance of Sweatt,
the court draws upon the state's history of past discrimination in
concluding that the law school's affirmative action program is
"boundless" in nature because "benefits are conferred on students
who attended out-of-state or private schools."'128 In arguing that
out-of-state students could not have experienced discrimination at
the state's hand and therefore are logically not entitled to a rem-
edy, 129 the court impliedly admits that minority students who are
residents of Texas might have valid claims of past discrimination
and may be entitled to a remedy. The court does not reason about
the deserts of this group of applicants, however.
Instead it moves on to another consideration that is external
to and beyond the control of these students who admittedly might
deserve a remedy for past discrimination. Without acknowledging
the counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent in its proposition, the
court argues, in any event, that the law school's affirmative action
program could only be legal if mandated by the state legislature. 130
In this way, the Fifth Circuit posits an acontextualized analy-
sis of history that ignores the intergenerational effects of discrimi-
nation in education and elsewhere on minority applicant pools. In
contrast to their prominence in the court's opinion when the "cold
numbers" are at issue, minority students per se-their educational
achievements and professional ambitions, the discrimination that
they may have encountered-are peripheral to the Hopwood
court's historical analysis.
127. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952-55 (rejecting district court's finding that law
school's poor reputation in minority communities, perceived hostile environment,
and underrepresentation of minorities constitutes past effects of Sweatt-era dis-
crimination).
128. Id. at 951, 955 n.50.
129. See id. at 955 n.50.
130. See id. at 951-52. To be legal, the Texas state legislature "would have to
find that past segregation has present effects; it would have to determine the
magnitude of those present effects; and it would need to limit carefully the 'plus'
given to applicants to remedy that harm." Id. at 951. The court fails to consider
that the majority White state legislature has little incentive to act on behalf of Af-
rican-American and Latino applicants to the law school. On the counter-
majoritarian function of judicial review, see JOHN HART ELY, Facilitating the Rep-
resentation of Minorities, in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980).
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How might the student's histories have been treated more
appropriately in the court's analysis? Before taking the drastic
step of holding that race could never be taken into account by ad-
missions officials at the University of Texas,13' the court might
have left the door open for officials to construct a race-conscious
remedy not "boundless" in nature. 132 The sweeping nature of the
court's holding in fact is inconsistent with its admission that race
may correlate with students' socioeconomic status or educational
backgrounds and that universities may take these facts into ac-
count in the admissions process. 133
In fact, the court's admission about a possible relationship be-
tween constitutionally permissible factors and race suggests that
the law school might construct an affirmative action program that
could pass strict scrutiny if it placed more emphasis upon appli-
cants' personal histories. 34 A sufficiently compelling and narrowly
tailored compensatory program might be designed to address an
individual's particular claim to redress for past discrimination.
For instance, an affirmative action program might benefit an Afri-
can-American applicant who was a resident of Texas, whose par-
ents (and/or grandparents) were residents of Texas and attended
segregated public schools-or no schools at all-in that state. 135
Such an applicant could not logically be understood to be unworthy
of the mere opportunity for recompense (as opposed to a guaran-
tee) that might be provided by the addition of points for historic
discrimination to her TI scores. These extra points would increase
the likelihood of that individual's admission to the law school,
rather than guarantee her preferential admission to the univer-
sity.
The Hopwood court's analysis precludes consideration of the
particular claims to redress of minority applicants because it was
131. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944, 955.
132. Id. at 951. "[B]oundless remedies [such as the law school's affirmative ac-
tion policy] raise a constitutional concern beyond mere competence. In this situa-
tion, an inference is raised that the program was the result of racial social engi-
ne'ering rather [than] a desire to implement a remedy [to past discrimination]." Id.
133. See id. at 946-47.
134. See id. at 946 ("While the use of race per se is proscribed, state-supported
schools may reasonably consider a host of factors - some of which may have some
correlation with race - in making decisions."); see also note 116 supra and accom-
panying text.
135. Cf. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554-57 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(beginning the opinion with a section providing "historical background" and elabo-
rating on the significance of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and suggesting
ways that past discrimination affects contemporary students' educational attain-
ment).
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predicated upon the general. That is, the particular historical
claims of individual students were subsumed beneath the group's
claim to redress. 136 Then the group claim was characterized both
as insufficiently compelling to warrant special treatment, and as
so common that remedial efforts to address the injury would be
impractical. 137 This mode of analysis amounts to a denial of his-
tory.
B. Neglect of Case Law Concerning Validation of Ability
Tests
Other than its cursory attention to students' personal histo-
ries, the single most problematic aspect of the Hopwood opinion is
the way in which the court simultaneously privileged the "cold
numbers," but refused to entertain a challenge to the credibility of
those same numbers. 138 It seems unprincipled that a court so con-
fident that African-American and Latino applicants' TIs show
them to be less deserving of legal education than Whites would de-
cline to consider evidence to the contrary.
The court's action is particularly questionable in light of the
fact that case law exists, much of it Fifth Circuit law, that concerns
validation of standardized measurements of ability. The precedent
derives from education law as well as employment discrimination
litigation.
1. Education Law
Federal courts have monitored the ways in which quantita-
tive measures of ability have been used in public education since
the late 1960s. 139 During this era, when school systems first began
implementing the integration mandate of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation 40 en masse, 41 courts were asked to settle concerns about
the use of putatively objective, but racial caste-perpetuating, abil-
ity tests. 42 Plaintiffs' concerns about testing and grouping were
straightforward. When school systems tested, ranked and grouped
136. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 951-55 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2580 (1996).
137. See id. at 950-55.
138. See infra notes 178-189 and accompanying text.
139. See generally JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK 184-90 (1985) (discussing
seminal cases on ability grouping).
140. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141. See GERALD N. ROSENBURG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 42-46 (1991).
142. See MARY FRANCES BERRY & JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, LONG MEMORY 281-82
(1982).
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students into separate ability tracks based on standardized test
performance, most African-American and/or low income students
invariably were placed in the lowest of these ability groupings. 143
J. Skelly Wright, a federal district court judge sitting in the
District of Columbia, issued the seminal ruling striking down an
ability grouping system. 144 Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit led the
movement to enjoin ability grouping practices that resulted in seg-
regated classrooms. 145 In these early cases, judges enjoined the
use of certain standardized testing mechanisms for placement of
students in ability groups on the grounds that these policies per-
petuated segregation in what ostensibly were newly desegregated
schools. 146 These judges thought it unfair that students who had
been inadequately trained in segregated schools should be penal-
ized by their new schools' testing and ability grouping policies.
As American society has traveled farther and farther in time
away from the period of de jure segregation, litigants have devel-
oped more sophisticated approaches to explaining the ways in
which testing and grouping systems may perpetuate the effects of
historical discrimination in education. In recent years plaintiffs
have advanced claims of racial discrimination based on disparate
impact and test invalidity, as well as on constitutional grounds.147
143. See OAKES, supra note 139, at 65-67.
144. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (striking down a
tracking system as violative of the equal protection rights of poor and minority
students).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Gadsen County Sch. Dist., 572 F.2d 1049 (5th
Cir. 1978) (enjoining use of an ability grouping system where the school board
could not show that disproportionate placement of minorities in low tracks was not
the result of past discrimination); see also McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 508
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975) (ruling that a school district may use any racially neutral
method of classroom assignment, unless the effect of the method is racial segrega-
tion or greatly inhibits equality of education); Moses v. Washington Parish Sch.
Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming the district court's finding that as-
signment of students in classes based on standardized ability and achievement
tests perpetuated segregated classrooms within the desegregated school); United
States v. Sunflower County Sch. Dist., 430 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming a
lower court's decision that a school which operated as a dual school system imper-
missibly used an achievement testing program in the assignment of students).
146. See, e.g., McNeal, 508 F.2d 1017 (holding that the "ability grouping system
which resulted in racially segregated classrooms could not be used by [the] school
district" which previously had racially segregated classrooms).
147. See e.g. Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1407-09 (11th Cir. 1981)
(discussing experts' findings regarding instructional validity of competency exam);
Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296, 1300-01 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (discussing expert
opinion on reliability of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test); Anderson v. Banks,
520 F. Supp. 472, 485-92 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (discussing results of validation studies
performed by experts on California Achievement Test), appeal dismissed, Johnson
v. Sikes, 730 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Foreseeable disparate impact alone is insufficient to make out an
equal protection claim; but together with compelling historical evi-
dence, adverse impact accompanied by expert testimony indicating
that the tests used for placement are invalid may substantiate an
allegation of discrimination. In Anderson v. Banks,148 for example,
a federal court enjoined an ability grouping system in part on the
basis of expert testimony suggesting that the school system's test-
ing practices were invalid. 49
This body of law on ability testing, both the older and the
more recent cases, has a distinctly distributive focus. This prece-
dent was created on the basis of courts' wariness of so many mem-
bers of a constitutionally protected class ending up at the bottom of
their academic classes. Awareness of the historic subjugation of
African-Americans in public educational systems served to rein-
force these courts' suspicions about caste-perpetuating educational
policies and methodologies. Given this skepticism, these courts did
not defer to the putative scientific validity of standardized tests.
Rather, they became engaged with psychometric experts, asking
for proof of tests' validity rather than assuming as much. In short,
the courts that developed the law on ability testing in elementary
and secondary education approached the issue from a critical per-
spective.
The higher education law that deals with testing, as exempli-
fied in Hopwood v. Texas, is quite underdeveloped in comparison
to the law on ability testing at the lower educational levels. The
Hopwood court's deferential approach to the TI is particularly
troubling in light of the Fifth Circuit's prominent role in the litiga-
tion which brought an end to unfair testing practices on the ele-
mentary and secondary levels. Even if the court ultimately had
remained unconvinced that the TI misstated the legal aptitude of
African-American and Latino students, the integrity of the judicial
process would have been well served by allowing expert witnesses
to submit evidence to the contrary.
148. 520 F. Supp. at 485-92.
149. See id. at 480-98, 501; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (enjoining use of invalidated IQ tests that resulted in the placement of
Black students in "dead-end" classes), affd in part, rev'd in part, 793 F.2d 969 (9th
Cir. 1981). Plaintiffs have prevailed in recent years on the theory that certain
grouping practices perpetuate past discrimination. See Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F.
Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1994). But see Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist.,
868 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the school district's limited form of abil-
ity grouping was not discriminatory).
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2. Employment Law
It substantiates the foregoing analysis to note that the valid-
ity of ability tests is routinely at issue in employment litigation.150
The brief analysis of the law on employment testing that follows is
provided to illuminate the discussion of the Hopwood opinion in
two ways. First, together with the discussion above of the law on
ability testing in education, it suggests the normalcy of judicial
skepticism toward quantitative measures of ability. In so doing,
the jurisprudence on testing in employment also suggests the ab-
normalcy and relative lack of sophistication of the Hopwood court's
reasoning about the TI.
The jurisprudence on employment testing is even more well-
developed than the law on ability testing in elementary and secon-
dary education. Because the jurisprudence on ability testing in
employment always turns on disparate impact analysis, 151 it is
more immediately concerned with distributive justice than the law
on educational testing. That is, while educational testing cases
may involve disparate impact analysis, they usually also require
proof that the present disparate effect of the educational practice
at issue is a result of de jure segregation. 152 By contrast, the dis-
parate impact theory of discrimination in employment testing is
concerned solely with maldistributions of goods in contemporary
society-adverse impacts that affect any protected class-women,
the aged and racial minorities, including those never subjected to
Jim Crow Laws. 15 3
Moreover, because disparate impact analysis necessitates ex-
tensive and complex statistical evidence from plaintiffs and the
employer, 154 it is presumed that the validity of ability tests must
be statistically proven in employment law. 15 5 After disparate im-
pact is proven, the burden of production shifts to employers to
150. See Michael Selmi, Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency, and the Affirma-
tive Action Debate, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1253 n.9 (1995).
151. See id. at 1257-58. For the seminal cases establishing the disparate impact
theory of employment discrimination, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425-35 (1975) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971).
152. See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
153. See Selmi, supra note 150, at 1258.
154. See id. at 1257-58.
155. See id. at 1261-76 (explaining statistical conventions used in the validation
process); see also Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"
Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157, 1165-67, 1208-21 (explaining the require-
ment of test validity under Title VII and critiquing the claim that tests are highly
valid).
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prove that the test is necessary.156 In this way, race-based differ-
entials in ability test scores substantiate claims of discrimination
and provide evidence to support the establishment of affirmative
action plans in employment law. 157 By contrast, in Hopwood such
differentials are deemed by both the plaintiffs and the presiding
court to imply the intellectual inferiority of African-American and
Latino students. These results are oppositional.
The divergence between the Hopwood court's approach to
empirical evidence purporting to measure ability and that of the
courts that have developed the jurisprudence on employment dis-
crimination is striking. The contrast is intuitively inappropriate.
While it is logical that courts handling different subject matter
would approach matters of law differently, quantitative evidence
raises questions of fact. It would seem that regardless of subject
matter, courts would approach factual questions about test validity
in a similar fashion: all courts should hear expert testimony about
the validity of empirical evidence in cases where such data is rele-
vant-whether employment litigation, cases on ability grouping in
secondary education, or a higher education case such as Hopwood.
C. The Conventional Judicial Approach to Expert Scientific
Testimony: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of how the
lower courts are to review scientific evidence proffered by expert
witnesses. The landmark case is Daubert v. MerreU Dow Pharina-
ceuticals, Inc.,158 a suit brought on behalf of children born with
birth defects allegedly caused by Bendectin, a prescription drug
made by Merrell Dow. 159 The consensus of the majority of scien-
tists was that the drug did not cause defects. 60 The predominant
perspective was countered by eight scientists, including a statisti-
cian who had found a correlation between Bendectin and birth de-
fects.' 6' The statistician found this correlation by reanalyzing the
thirty-plus scientific studies that purported to show a lack of cor-
156. See Kelman, supra note 155, at 1166 n.23.
157. See Selmi, supra note 150, at 1258-60. Employers cannot use affirmative
action plans to make up for discriminatory testing practices; however, firms may
be held liable for invalid tests notwithstanding appropriate racial balances in the
workplace resulting from affirmative action policies. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982).
158. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
159. See id. at 582.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 583.
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relation between the drug and prenatal defects. 162 The district
court, however, found the eight scientists' work inadmissible be-
cause it was unpublished and not subjected to peer review. 16 3
The Court granted certiorari in Daubert to consider what
standard should govern the admissibility of controverted scientific
evidence.164 Acknowledging that "there are no certainties in sci-
ence,"16 5 the Court adopted a flexible rule that allows courts to
admit scientific opinions if they are demonstrably sound. These
opinions are admissible even if held by a minority of scientists and
if they espouse a novel point of view. 166 In other words, the Court
held that the admissibility of scientific testimony or evidence de-
pends on the basis of its validity (whether a scientific principle
supports what it purports to show) and reliability (whether the
principle yields consistent results). 167
The significance of Daubert can only be appreciated fully in
light of the law that it displaced. Daubert superseded the rule
previously instituted by Frye v. United States,168 which required
that scientific testimony be admitted on the basis of "general ac-
ceptance" in the relevant field. 69 Frye's "general acceptance"
standard would deem the Daubert testimony inadmissible because
only a minority of scientists held this view. By definition, the Frye
standard made a predominant scientific viewpoint a proxy for a
reliable and valid scientific perspective. Additionally, the Frye
standard did not require a showing of validity and reliability at
trial.170 Consequently, one could argue that the Frye rule func-
tioned to preserve the scientific status quo, or that the Daubert
standard is less restrictive than the Frye standard as to the admis-
sibility of novel evidence.' 7 1 This argument is persuasive insofar
as scientists engaged in peer review, the gatekeepers to admissi-
162. See id. at 583 & n.2.
163. See id. at 584.
164. See id. at 585.
165. Id. at 590.
166. See id. at 597.
167. See id. at 590-92.
168. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
169. Id. at 1014.
170. See Lawrence B. Ebert, Frye After Daubert: The Role of Scientists in Ad-
inissibility Issues as Seen Through Analysis of the DNA Profiling Cases, 1993 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219, 224.
171. See G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential
Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 952 (1996) C'Daubert made
it possible for litigants to get in testimony from scientific experts who operate out-
side the mainstream.").
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bility under the Frye standard, 172 would tend less often to accept as
"good science" innovative, minority viewpoints than would the
judges who are the final arbiters of admissibility under Daubert.173
The reality that judges are lay persons in terms of scientific
knowledge probably predisposes them to acceptance of novel scien-
tific results.174
The fundamental difference between the Frye and Daubert
rules is extraordinarily important to the arguments made in this
Article. This is because the Hopwood court's uncritical acceptance
of the TI relates directly to its failure to admit and consider the
expert scientific testimony of Dr. Martin Shapiro. Recall that
Shapiro, a psychometrist, was prepared to provide statistical evi-
dence about the validity and reliability of the TI as it relates to Af-
rican-American students attending the University of Texas Law
School. 175 Without question, Shapiro's would have been a minority
perspective on the validity and reliability of the LSAT. The pre-
vailing position, officially held by the LSAC and law schools like
the University of Texas that rely heavily upon the test in the ad-
missions process, is that the LSAT is just as valid and reliable a
predictor of performance among these groups as for Whites. 176 Of
course, this perspective-the generally accepted scientific view
about the LSAT's usefulness-is held by these institutions not-
withstanding the indisputable reality that African-Americans and
Latinos on average perform less well on the test than Whites and
thus are systematically disadvantaged by its widespread use. 177
These circumstances would appear to have made Shapiro's proffer
of evidence opposing the generally accepted view of the LSAT of
obvious value to the Hopwood court's process of reasoning about
an affirmative action policy. After all, the disparate racial impact
172. See Ebert, supra note 170, at 224.
173. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589-97 (1993);
Ebert, supra note 170, at 224.
174. See Ebert, supra note 170, at 224; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law
Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implications of the Daubert Court's Recog-
nition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 64 (1995).
The Daubert ruling is not without controversy, however. Some disagree that it is
an unqualified improvement over the Frye standard. See, e.g., Ebert, supra note
170, at 222-23, 232-50 (arguing that the "general acceptance" concept enunciated
in Frye should be a precondition to admissibility of scientific evidence and that it is
superior to the more general standard enunciated in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579).
175. See infra notes 178-189 and accompanying text (explaining that Shapiro's
expert testimony was denied admission into evidence); infra app.
176. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 21 (listing the TI composites for Whites, African-Americans
and Mexican-Americans); supra note 89 (stating that Latinos and African-
Americans score, on average, 100 points lower than Whites).
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of the University of Texas' reliance upon LSAT scores as a proxy
for ability is one of the factors which necessitates the affirmative
action policy.
Yet, Shapiro was not allowed to submit his expert opinion to
the court.178 According to the court, its decision to deny admission
of this testimony was not made on the merits, but on procedural
grounds, specifically the "law of the case" doctrine. 179 This ration-
ale for disallowing Shapiro's testimony was predicated upon the
district court's refusal to allow the Thurgood Marshall Legal Soci-
ety to intervene in the case prior to the start of trial. 80 According
to the Fifth Circuit panel, the district court's denial of intervention
meant that the issue of the TI's validity already had been
"implicitly addressed" by the lower court.181
178. Shapiro's testimony was integral to the petition by the proposed plaintiff-
intervenor for a rehearing en banc, as well as on its appeal of the district court's
pre-trial denial of its intervention. Both of these petitions were made on grounds
that the University of Texas could not present Shapiro's testimony because doing
so would imply that the University was liable under Title VI.
If allowed to participate as parties in this case, proposed intervenors
would make essential arguments and introduce important evidence that
the defendants cannot or will not advance.... [P]roposed intervenors' de-
fense of the existing admissions program may cast doubt on the predictive
value of the Texas Index... in selecting applicants. .... [This argument]
... is important to this case yet contrary to the defendants' institutional
interests.
Petition for Rehearing at 7, Hopwood (citations omitted); see also id. at 4-8.
Proposed intervenors' appeal of both the district court's decision to deny pre-
trial intervention and its petition for rehearing en banc were denied by the Fifth
Circuit. See id. at 6; see also Hopwood v. Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 721 (5th Cir. 1996)
(denying rehearing en banc).
In addition to making these appeals to the circuit court, proposed intervenors
tried to present Shapiro's expert testimony to the district court by way of a decla-
ration attached to a post-trial brief. See Petition for Rehearing, Hopwood
(Declaration of Martin M. Shapiro). The district court declined, however, to con-
sider this evidence. See Petition for Rehearing at 4 n.5, Hopwood.
Thus on several occasions the district and appellate courts had an opportunity
to consider Shapiro's testimony, but declined to do so. As the proposed intervenors
had suggested in their several appeals to the appellate court, absent the Fifth Cir-
cuit's ruling on their behalf, evidence concerning the TI's validity and reliability
was never a part of the formal record and decision making process in Hopwood v.
Texas. See Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722. The University of Texas never defended its
affirmative action program on grounds that it was necessitated by a discriminatory
TI system. See Petition for Rehearing at 8, Hopwood. Nor did the University join
the proposed intervenors in their petition to the Fifth Circuit for rehearing en banc
of the panel's decision. See Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722 (Politz, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing) ('For reasons that have been communicated to this court, and
upon which we can only speculate, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants have
sought rehearing en banc.").
179. Petition for Rehearing at 6, Hopwood.
180. See id. at 5-6.
181. Id. at 6.
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While admitting that such a determination was within the
appeals court's discretion, I disagree with the panel's decision to
reject Shapiro's testimony and find its rationale weak. The fact
that this testimony was "implicitly" raised in prior motions to a
lower court, as the panel argues, should not have absolved the
court of appeals from its responsibility to rule on the merits con-
cerning its admissibility under the law of the case doctrine. 8 2
Since the proposed intervenors filed contemporaneous appeals of
district court opinions that only "implicitly addressed" Shapiro's
testimony, the Fifth Circuit failed to rule on the merits of his ex-
pert opinion. Thus, the court's final determination on the admissi-
bility of this testimony (the denial of rehearing en banc) seems to
have reflected its profound conviction to discard Shapiro's prof-
fer. 183
The court's judgment not to admit Shapiro's testimony was
inconsistent with the convention established in Daubert, as well as
mistaken on prudential grounds. As an initial matter, it is impor-
tant to note that the Daubert standard applies uniformly. 184 It is
182. Compare Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting that the city's representation of proposed intervenors' was adequate until
the city responded to the motion for summary judgment and failed to raise the af-
firmative defense that the proposed intervenors wished to proffer), with Reid v.
Rolling Fork Util. Dist., 979 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the law of
the case doctrine does not apply when controlling authority has not made a con-
trary decision of law, or evidence at a subsequent trial was substantially different
from a prior trial).
183. The judges who dissented from the full court's denial of rehearing en banc
in Hopwood arrived at a similar, though more sweeping, conclusion:
To decline to rehear a case of this magnitude ... bespeaks an abdication
of duty-the ducking of a tough question by judges who we know first-
hand are made of sterner stuff. . . . By tenuously stringing together
pieces and shards of recent Supreme Court opinions that have dealt with
race ... the panel creates a gossamer chain which it proffers as a justifi-
cation for overruling Bakke. We are persuaded that this alone makes the
instant case not just en banc-worthy but en banc mandatory.
Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722 (Politz, King, Wiener, Benavides, Stewart, Parker and
Dennis, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Given the apparent rigidity of the court's position regarding Shapiro's testi-
mony, it would be unproductive to engage in a detailed analysis of the court's deci-
sion not to admit this testimony. A debate about whether the court's decision was
justified as a matter of procedure would be inapposite to this Article's overall ob-
jective and this section's discussion of Daubert. This Article's skepticism about the
Hopwood court's reasoning rests on a fundamental critique of unsubstantiated as-
sumptions that it makes about the TI-a matter of substance to which procedural
questions are incidental.
184. Daubert explains the scope and applicability of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which govern the admissibility of any evidence relevant to an action
brought in federal court, which is defined as that which has "any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See
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applicable to all of the disparate areas of law to which scientific
evidence is relevant, from criminal matters, to family law issues,
to constitutional questions. The Court did not indicate that an ex-
ception or special rule might be formulated and applied in cases
involving racial discrimination. Thus, any assumption that expert
scientific testimony proffered in cases involving education and af-
firmative action policies may be treated differently from that prof-
fered in other cases, including the cases concerning validation of
ability tests in employment and elementary and secondary educa-
tion discussed above, 8 5 is without merit.
The presentation and evaluation of Shapiro's viewpoint
would have been significant to the court's decision making process
for concrete reasons. Precisely because it is a minority point of
view that stands in opposition to the generally accepted view of the
LSAT's credibility, Shapiro's opinion would have been a wise con-
sideration for the court. This is just the kind of testimony about
which the Daubert majority theorizes and for which it does not
preclude the possibility of admissibility. 186 Shapiro's evidence
might have illuminated flaws in the design of the studies upon
which the generally accepted perspective on the merits of the
LSAT in the law school admissions process is predicated. His re-
search attaches a different meaning to data revealing a racial gap
in applicants' scores than do others who attest to the validity and
reliability of the LSAT. Unlike those who hold the predominant
view of the LSAT's merits in screening law school applicants,
Shapiro does not simply note that African-Americans typically per-
form poorer on the test than do Whites and conclude that this ra-
cial difference is a "natural" result. 8 7 Instead, he finds it signifi-
cant that while the LSAT may predict well the performance of
Whites in the first year of law school, it is not a good predicator of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (quoting
Rule 401, F.R. Evid.). In particular, Daubert interprets Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which pertains to the admissibility of any "scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge" that "will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue" in an action. Id. at 588 (quoting Rule 702
F.R. Evid.). Thus, Daubert applies to any subject matter or action over which a
federal court asserts jurisdiction. For a discussion of the variety of matters en-
compassed in this category, see John Monahan, Daubert and the Reference Man-
ual: An Essay on the Future of Science in Law, 82 VA. L. REV. 837, 846-47 (1996)
(describing statistical inference, multiple regression analysis, epidemiology, toxi-
cology, survey research, forensic analysis of DNA, and estimation of economic loss
as areas that often are the subject of scientific expert testimony in federal court).
185. See supra notes 139-157 and accompanying text.
186. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
187. See Declaration of Martin Shapiro, at 9-18 (Discussing concept of test va-
lidity and invalidity of TI as applied to African-Americans).
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performance for many Blacks. 188 In other words, Shapiro argues
that there are at least some scenarios in which the test is invalid
and unreliable for measuring the ability of these applicants.
8 9
Considering the court's reasoning, its decision about the ad-
missibility of Shapiro's testimony could have been determinative of
the outcome of Hopwood insofar as Shapiro was able to cast doubt
on the notion of "cold numbers." Consideration of Shapiro's view-
point presumably would have undermined the court's tendency to
view the TI as an infallible measurement of ability. The court's
conception of science would have been less idealized and more con-
sistent with the uncertainty and experimentation that are inher-
ent in the scientific method. 90 Thus, Shapiro's testimony would
have undermined the court's conclusion that the racial gap in TI
scores was a material fact indicative of White and non-White ap-
plicants' just deserts in the law school admissions process. In turn,
Shapiro's testimony would have made the court's analysis of the
constitutional issues presented in Hopwood more focused and im-
measurably more credible. Absent the obfuscating influence of the
"cold numbers," the court's arguments for or against the law
school's affirmative action program more likely would have turned
on the constitutional issues: the concept of equal protection of the
law and the merits and demerits of the rationales proffered by the
state of Texas in support of its race-conscious law school admis-
sions policy.
188.
The witness' [Shapiro's] evaluation of statistics about the University of
Texas Law School entering classes of 1986, 1987, and 1988... indicated
that the 'Texas Index" calculation upon which the Law School largely
based its admissions decisions could reliably predict less than 10% of the
variation in first-year grades for African-American students--whatever its
validity for White students.
Petition for Rehearing at 4, Hopwood.
189. See id. at 7. Professor Claude Steele recently conducted research similar to
Shapiro's. Steele addresses the racial gap in performance on standardized tests in
terms of overprediction or underperformance, concepts that describe the phe-
nomenon of something other than skills deficits depressing performance. For
Steele, stereotype threat helps to explain this underperformance. See Steele, su-
pra note 53, at 613-29; Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and
the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 797-811 (1995).
190. See Imwinkelried, supra note 174, at 59-61 (describing the popular concep-
tion of science as resting on an idealized assumption that the universe is governed
by mechanical and inexorable laws discoverable by scientific investigation).
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IV. The Instrumental Result of Deterministic Analysis
Ultimately, the salience of the racial differential in appli-
cants' TIs to the Hopwood court and its failure to hear expert tes-
timony that would have challenged this perspective affected the
court's application of the law. In keeping with its narrow focus on
the "cold numbers," the court's discussion of the constitutional is-
sues involved in Hopwood seems not so much a response to the
complexity of the legal issues and factual record. The opinion ap-
pears more like an instrumental argument oriented toward a spe-
cific result-the striking down of an admissions program that is
perceived to be unfair to Whites who are denied admission to the
University of Texas Law School despite superior numbers. In
other words, the court's expectation that high-scoring White stu-
dents deserve to fare well in the law school application process
(and that lower-scoring students, including Blacks and Latinos, do
not) seems to inform its application of the strict scrutiny test to the
law school's affirmative action program.
A. The Court's Misconception of the Nature of Strict Scrutiny
Review After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena:191 Still
"Strict in Theory, Fatal in Fact"92
That the concept of just deserts so informs the court's rea-
soning about the constitutional issues implies that the Hopwood
court misapprehends the nature of its inquiry under the strict
scrutiny standard, particularly in the post-Adarand era. Contrary
to the court's apparent perception, the strict scrutiny standard is
not an archetypal rule of law; that is, unlike most rules applicable
in civil or criminal law, the concept of strict scrutiny does not ne-
cesssarily confer certain rights or responsibilities. 193 Instead,
strict scrutiny is a rule designed by judges for judges that be-
speaks a certain attitude or posture. 194 Thus, it is incorrect for
strict scrutiny to be taken to imply a definite judgment about any
hypothetical or real distribution of benefits and burdens: conclu-
sions about the propriety of particular social arrangements are not
embedded in the standard itself. Instead, judges are to use the
standard as a guide in decision making.
And yet, the concept of strict scrutiny is ambiguous on its
face, in my judgment, at least when compared to other standards
191. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
192. Id. at 237.
193. See FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 124.
194. See id.
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that judges must apply in making determinations about appropri-
ate results in cases. For instance, the strict scrutiny standard is
unlike the rule instituted in Daubert, which incorporates specific
factors that a court should consider in making a determination
whether scientific evidence is valid and reliable. 195 The court's in-
quiry under strict scrutiny review turns on two determinations:
the importance of the governmental objective proffered by the
state (whether it is compelling) and an estimation of whether the
race-conscious policy that the state has chosen to achieve this pur-
pose is necessary (sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling objective). 196
Insofar as determinations under the strict scrutiny standard
are predicated upon the thoughts and values of the presiding
judge, they are made without reference to any standardized or sys-
temized criteria whatsoever. Such decision making implies much
more subjectivity than criteria like "validity" and "reliability" es-
tablished under Daubert.197
This view of strict scrutiny is not dependent on the strength
of my arguments alone. The cases applying the standard to race-
conscious programs characterized as benign in nature do not offer
concrete guidance as to how these two prongs of the test are to be
applied by the lower courts.198 To the contrary, the Court's recent
decisions mandating that affirmative action programs be subjected
to strict scrutiny discourage courts from conceptualizing the in-
quiry as a substantive rule requiring the striking down of all race-
conscious programs: 199 The Court itself acknowledges the com-
195. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94
(1993) (directing the lower court's ruling on the admissibility of scientific evidence
to consider many variables, including whether the scientific technique can be
tested; whether it can be falsified; whether it has been subjected to peer review or
published; the technique's rate of error in producing results; whether standards for
controlling the technique's operation exist and are maintained; and whether the
technique is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community); FOSTER &
HUBER, supra note 29, at 15.
196. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the gov-
ernmental policy of interning Japanese-Americans on grounds that it was required
for the compelling objective of military necessity).
197. However, "validity" and "reliability" are also socially constructed concepts
subject to criticism (as argued in Parts II and III).
198. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
199. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e
wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'.
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial dis-
crimination... is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it."); id. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against ap-
plication of rigid strict scrutiny analysis to affirmative action programs on grounds
that while invidious discrimination "is an engine of oppression," affirmative action
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plexities involved in applying the strict scrutiny "formula" after
Adarand and Croson.200 It is apparent then that rigid application
of the strict scrutiny standard to each and every racial classifica-
tion in exactly the same way is inconsistent with both the letter
and spirit of the law.
B. The Corrective Rationale
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the corrective rationale for the
University of Texas' affirmative action program is predicated upon
assumptions contrary to the ambiguities and complexities inherent
in strict scrutiny. Its approach stands in sharp contrast to the no-
tion that Adarand and Croson do not provide concrete instructions
for how to apply the strict scrutiny standard.20' To the contrary,
the court handles the issue of fit between the law school's objective
in instituting the affirmative action program and the particular
remedy established in Hopwood as if Croson and Adarand dictate
the inexorable result of finding the policy unlawful. 20 2 In this way,
the court treats the strict scrutiny standard as if it were a substan-
tive rule.
This assumption is reflected, for instance, in the Hopwood
court's uncomplicated application of Croson and Adarand, which
involved employment issues 20 3 and federal contracting,20 4 to the
relevant factual scenario in Hopwood, which involved legal educa-
tion.205 The court proceeds as if there is no question that affirma-
tive action in higher education should be treated in exactly the
same manner as race-conscious practices are treated in the areas
implicated in Croson and Adarand. It never suggests that a dis-
policies "reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society"); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
200. Some scholars also have pointed out that it is unclear just how lower courts
should apply the holdings of Adarand and Croson to various factual scenarios.
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432-44 (1997); Ak-
hil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1746-
49, 1756-58, 1767-71 (1996); David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public
Interest, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 2-14, 4 n.13. Other commentators have argued that
the notion of applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs is simply
wrong. See, e.g., Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative
Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51 (1996) (arguing that the courts' application of the
strict scrutiny standard to affirmative action programs has been inconsistent and
has impeded legitimate governmental efforts to remedy discrimination).
201. The court acknowledges and then dismisses in a footnote the fact that Ada-
rand gives no direction about how to apply its holding. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 941 n.18 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
202. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940-41, 944-45, 950-51.
203. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
204. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 204.
205. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932.
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tinction might be drawn between the way in which strict scrutiny
is applied in these substantive areas even though the Supreme
Court had not addressed the issue, directly or indirectly. The
Court neither had overruled Regents of University of California v.
Bakke206 nor included a footnote in Adarand or Croson suggesting
that the landmark case was in danger of being overruled prior to
the Fifth Circuit's consideration of Hopwood.
The tone and choice of words used by the court in its analysis
of the compensatory rationale for Texas' affirmative action pro-
gram also reveals its view that "strict scrutiny" is substantive in
nature.207 The court goes well beyond emphasizing the "highly
suspect" nature of racial classifications in traditional Supreme
Court jurisprudence. 208 It stresses that "there is absolutely no
doubt" that strict scrutiny is to be applied even to those racial clas-
sifications "characterized by their proponents as 'benign' or
'remedial."'209 This tone of certitude and uncompromising lan-
guage appears so consistently in the opinion that the reader can-
not fail to appreciate its meaning. The Hopwood court is suggest-
ing that it knows exactly what strict scrutiny is and how to
determine which interests are compelling and whether programs
are narrowly tailored.210
The upshot of the court's assumptions about Croson, Adarand
and the strict scrutiny standard, together with its convictions
about the "cold numbers," is its rejection of the corrective rationale
for the law school's affirmative action program. Yet, each of these
assumptions is an abstraction which obscures the historical issues
that underlie Hopwood v. Texas. The focus on these external mat-
ters clouds the court's ability to appreciate and review the histori-
cal evidence that it was obliged to evaluate in considering the pro-
priety of compensatory remedies for African-American and Latino
applicants to the University of Texas Law School. 211 Instead of
thoughtfully addressing the core historical issues, the Hopwood
206. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (upholding the use of race as a factor in considering the
admission of applicants to schools of higher education).
207. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940 C[D]iscrimination based upon race is highly
suspect.").
208. See id. at 940-4 1.
209. Id. at 940.
210. See id. at 940-41 (explicating Supreme Court precedent concerning race-
conscious state action as if the concepts of "strict scrutiny," "narrow tailoring" and
"compelling governmental interest" do not lend themselves to ambiguous interpre-
tations in theory or in terms of practical application).
211. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
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court de-emphasizes the nature and duration of past discrimina-
tion in Texas' educational system. 21 2
Thus, its analysis of the corrective rationale for affirmative
action at the law school is uncomplicated. Rather than addressing
the historical issues, the court makes conclusory statements to the
effect that there are no facts in the record to substantiate appel-
lants' claims of present effects of past discrimination by the law
school. 213 Having concluded that the historical record is inade-
quate, the court simply holds that the affirmative action program
is not a compelling state interest under Croson and Adarand.
214
The certainty with which the Hopwood court rejects the cor-
rective rationale proffered by the state of Texas in defense of its
affirmative action program is misplaced. The factual issues in-
volved in this case were of national import and deserved careful,
rather than cursory, consideration under the appropriate standard
and applicable law.
C. The Diversity Rationale
Given its uncomplicated analysis of the law school's attempt
to justify its admissions practices as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion, the court devotes most of its attention to whether Texas' af-
firmative action program can pass constitutional muster on the di-
versity rationale. 215 This part of the Hopwood opinion essentially
consists of an attack on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,2 16 as the
court considers it the sole support in law for the diversity rationale
for affirmative action.2 17 Rebutting the legitimacy of Powell's uni-
laterally invented principle of justice, the court also squarely re-
jects the notion that diversity can serve as a rationale for affirma-
tive action at the University of Texas.218
212. See supra notes 110-135 and accompanying text.
213. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 949 n.39, 952-54 (5th Cir. 1996); but
see Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 572-73 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (indicating that
evidence presented at trial demonstrates lingering effects of past discrimination);
see also note 127 supra.
214. See 78 F.3d at 950-51, 951 n.44, 955.
215. See id. at 941-48.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 945 ("In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme
Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling justification for gov-
ernmental race-based discrimination.").
218. See id. at 944.
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race. . . for the pur-
pose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest ....
Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has
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The court's reading of Bakke is problematic, however. While
Justice Powell's opinion did champion diversity as a rationale for
affirmative action, the holding of Bakke was narrower. Four jus-
tices joined the portion of Powell's opinion that held that race may
be counted as a "plus" in the university admissions process.219
These justices embraced affirmative action in higher education as
a corrective measure for past discrimination. 2 0 Some passages of
their opinion implied that these policies may be used to increase
representation of minorities on college campuses, even without
specific findings of past discrimination by governmental bodies, on
the theory that such underrepresentation related intuitively to
that history.
[O]ur cases under Title VII ... have held that ... Congress
may require or authorize preferential treatment for those
likely disadvantaged by societal racial discrimination. Such
legislation has been sustained even without... findings of in-
tentional racial discrimination .... These decisions compel
the conclusion that States also may adopt race-conscious pro-
grams designed to overcome substantial, chronic minority un-
derrepresentation where there is reason to believe that the
evil addressed is a product of past racial discrimination. 221
Indeed, the opinion went so far as to invoke the notion of
"disparate impact" in upholding the University of California's af-
never represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any
other case.
Id.
219. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) ('2Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some uses of race in uni-
versity admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us to make five
votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it prohibits ... race-conscious pro-
grams in the future.").
220. See id. at 325 (stating that the "central meaning" of the opinion was that
the government could take race into account to remedy disadvantages cast on mi-
norities by past prejudice).
221. Id. at 366.
[Tihe presence or absence of past discrimination by universities or em-
ployers is largely irrelevant to resolving respondenes constitutional
claims. The claims of those burdened by the race-conscious actions of a
university or employer who has never been adjudged in violation of an an-
tidiscrimination law are not any more or less entitled to deference than
the claims of the burdened nonminority workers. ..[who] are innocent of
past discrimination.
Id. at 365; see also id. at 367 n.40 ("[Tihe State is [not] powerless to minimize the
consequences of racial discrimination by voters when it is regularly practiced at
the polls.") (quoting United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977));
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 370-71 ("Davis clearly could conclude that the serious and per-
sistent underrepresentation of minorities in medicine ... is the result of ...pur-
poseful discrimination against minorities in education and in society generally, as
well as in the medical profession.").
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firmative action policy. 2 2 2 Thus, the votes of these four justices,
plus that of Powell, who justified the policy on a diversity the-
ory,223 should be deemed to provide authority in support of the
general concept of affirmative action. 224 Bakke should be read
broadly as a statement that universities are not enjoined from
taking race into account in admissions, rather than narrowly.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Hopwood court is correct
that only Justice Powell embraced the diversity rationale for af-
firmative action in Bakke,225 its dismissal of diversity as a compel-
ling interest is questionable. Language in Wygant v. Board of
Education226 squarely contradicts the court's assumption that di-
versity cannot be used to support affirmative action in educa-
tion.227 Wygant appears to carve out, in the educational context, a
special exception to the jurisprudential norm, holding that past
discrimination is the only legitimate rationale for race-conscious
remedies. 228
In any event, it seems clear enough that the prerogative lies
with the Supreme Court, rather than with a single appellate
panel, to decide whether to maintain or eliminate the legitimacy of
the diversity rationale in the educational context. In taking it
222. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369.
Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a
state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of
such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might
otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact
is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of soci-
ety at large.
Id.
223. See id. at 311-12 ("[Attainment of a diverse student body] clearly is a con-
stitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education .... The free-
dom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selec-
tion of its student body.").
224. See supra notes 216-222 and accompanying text (discussing rationales for
affirmative action and Justice Powell's views in particular).
225. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2580 (1996) ('Justice Powell's opinion has appeared to represent the 'swing
vote,' and though, in significant part .... it was joined by no other Justice, it has
played a prominent role in subsequent debates concerning the impact of Bakke.").
226. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
227. See id. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
("[A]Ithough its precise contours are uncertain, a state interest in the promotion of
racial diversity has been found to be sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the con-
text of higher education ... ").
228. For arguments that affirmative action is uniquely appropriate in educa-
tional environments, see Amar & Katyal, supra note 200; Brest & Oshige, supra
note 25, at 862-65; and An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling
Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1996).
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upon itself to disestablish the legitimacy of the diversity rationale
and thus of Bakke, the Fifth Circuit created dubious precedent. 229
V. Beyond Determinism: Toward a Mode of Analysis that
Contemplates the Totality of Evidence About Social and
Material Inequality
To be sure, a future court will revisit the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation of Bakke's meaning. Against the backdrop of the pre-
vious discussion of the Hopwood court's putative overruling of
Bakke, this Part suggests legal and policy implications of the Hop-
wood court's reasoning.
A. From Instrumental to Functional Judicial Reasoning
About the Legality of Race-Conscious Remedies
A fundamental thesis of this Article has been the clouding in-
fluence of science, specifically the quantitative representations of
ability represented by the TI. By analyzing the text of the Hop-
wood court's opinion against the backdrop of precedent, I have
demonstrated ways in which the illusion of scientific certainty ob-
fuscated historical and contemporary socioeconomic issues pre-
sented in this case. 230 I have also shown that the court overlooked
the conventional judicial standard for considering scientific evi-
dence because of its zeal for the TI. 23 1 The first section of this con-
cluding part considers on a more abstract level why the type of sci-
entific rationality relied upon by the Fifth Circuit is inappropriate
for deciding the important issues raised in constitutional law cases
such as Hopwood. In doing so, I explain how the mistakes of the
Hopwood court should lead future courts to a more functional
mode of reasoning about affirmative action in education.
A single observation illuminates why future courts should
avoid the approach favored in Hopwood: The fundamental differ-
ence between science and law is that while rigid techniques are
inherent in the scientific method and a search for accurate results
is the objective of scientific inquiry, 232 the modes of reasoning typi-
cally used in law are varied and amorphous in nature, and the goal
of legal inquiry is functional. 233 To be sure, lawyers aspire to con-
229. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
230. See supra notes 137-157 and 191-228 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 158-185 and accompanying text.
232. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993) (discussing methods and objectives of scientific inquiry).
233. See FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 192; FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 29, at
17.
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sistency; the law gains legitimacy through adherence to certain
conventions of interpretation and uniform application of rules.2 34
Unlike scientists, however, lawyers invoke a range of concepts or
modalities in reasoning about appropriate outcomes in cases.235
Lawyers make arguments based conceptually on efficiency, utility,
retribution, autonomy, equality, or the universal idiom of rights.236
They formulate historical, textual, structural, doctrinal and pru-
dential arguments to support certain outcomes over others.237
These modes of reasoning are invoked in furtherance of stare deci-
sis, but also in service of social and political change. 238
Inconsistencies, or novel interpretations of old precepts, gain
legitimacy by reference to a lawyer's or judge's search for justice.239
Indeed, the pursuit and achievement of justice and just results is a
transcendent value in the American legal system. 240 At the same
time as justice is held as a transcendent value, it is commonly ac-
cepted that justice is relative: the extent to which an outcome is
just is a function of prevailing standards and practices in moral
theory and among presiding judges.241 Thus, law is often a highly
indeterminate enterprise.242 In this important respect, law is quite
unlike the scientific method. By concerning itself with the racial
differences in applicants' TIs and assuming the validity of this in-
dex, 243 rather than reasoning about it from a critical perspective,
the Hopwood court failed to appreciate or respect this reality.
It is incumbent upon future courts to develop a form of rea-
soning about affirmative action in higher education that is more
nuanced than was the analytical approach relied upon by the
Hopwood court. For the Fifth Circuit's opinion in this case
amounts to a rigid application of the strict scrutiny standard to the
adverse ruling against the University of Texas Law School's af-
firmative action program. It does not seem to be an intellectually
234. Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 144-46 (1991)
(arguing that although rules are applied to attempt to achieve justice, rules or
principles are not needed to achieve justice).
235. See id. at 11-22.
236. See FLETCHER, supra note 18, at 192.
237. See BOBBITT, supra note 234, at 12-13.
238. See id. at 23-28, 122-40, 158.
239. See id. at 118-21, 146-49.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 168.
242. See id. at 31-42.
243. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935-38 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
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honest, thoughtful, or particularly rigorous engagement of the
facts.
How might courts avoid the insufficiency of the Hopwood
court's analysis? A more nuanced doctrinal approach requires,
most of all, intellectual distance from the strict scrutiny standard,
before attempting to apply it to the facts of specific cases.244 This
word formula-which appears nowhere in the Constitution-is
much to blame for the collective of tortured opinions issued by
courts over the last two decades that we generously term the
"jurisprudence" on affirmative action.245 It has come to over-
whelm, if not strangle, analysis of cases involving race and race-
conscious remedies. 246 The result has been to blind some courts to
the real stakes at issue in cases involving affirmative action, in all
their complexity. 247
244. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
strict scrutiny should apply to all racial classifications); Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed-
eral Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate level
scrutiny to preferences for broadcast licenses to minorities); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (establishing a category of benign racial dis-
crimination); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (establishing a
strict scrutiny standard for review of racial classifications); Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932
(applying a strict scrutiny standard to a law school's affirmative action program).
245. For a seminal discussion of the extra-textual mediating principles applied
in traditional equal protection jurisprudence to interpret degrees of means-end
rationality, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PuB. AFFAIRS 107, 107-08, 111-15 (1976).
246. Professor Fiss elucidates the structural reasons why formulas may over-
whelm constitutional analysis:
The antidiscrimination principle seems to respond to an aspiration for a
'mechanical jurisprudence" . . . by making the predicate of intervention
appear technocratic. The antidiscrimination principle seems to ask no
more of the judiciary than that it engage in what might at first seem to be
the near mathematical task of determining whether there is . . .
"overinclusiveness" or "underinclusiveness" or ... the right "fit" between
means and ends. The terms used have an attractively quantitative ring.
They make the task of judicial judgment appear to involve as little discre-
tion as when a salesman advises a customer whether a pair of shoes fit.
Id. at 120; see also Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
739 (1982) (discussing the "bounded objectivity" of law's disciplining rules and the
dynamic relationship among text, reader and rules that produces interpretation).
247. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.2d 692, 701-02 (9th
Cir. 1997) (determining that Proposition 209 banning race and gender preferences
is presumptively constitutional on theory that the strict scrutiny test as applied in
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) and Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), does not countenance inconsistency); Podberesky v. Kir-
wan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1993) (de-
emphasizing past discrimination and accusing district court of "restlessness in ap-
plying strict scrutiny standard" because of its failure to analyze scholarship pro-
gram in terms of applicants "qualified" by standardized test scores); id. at 155-58
(finding underrepresentation and low retention rates of African-American students
insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny on theory that their academic underachieve-
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Redirecting intellectual energies from the word formula to
the real stakes requires a consideration of much more than the
particular parties represented in any one case. For society at large
is at stake in these cases: educational opportunity is at stake; the
lives of individual students are at stake; the economic viability and
social well-being of various groups of students are on the line, as is
the health of the nation as a whole. Reviewing a case from this
point of departure should logically lead to a consideration of the
totality of evidence about social and material existence that is the
backdrop in cases involving affirmative action in education. From
this perspective it should be clear why demographic differences
among all students affected by affirmative action policies (race, re-
ligion, parental income/occupation or geographic origin),248 as well
as their individuality (for instance, college major, career aspira-
tion, unique characteristics or abilities) should be a part of a
court's analytical calculus when reaching determinations about the
various affirmative action programs.
Regardless of the observer's perspective on the purpose of ju-
dicial review or her political orientation, it is important to appreci-
ate all of the interests at stake in these cases. Otherwise, like a
public that rejects the verdict of a jury that deliberates hastily in a
case of national interest, readers of an opinion written by a court
seemingly indifferent to the claims of certain affected parties may
doubt the integrity of the court's process of reasoning. Legitimacy
is lost.
If judges can appreciate cases involving affirmative action in
education in terms of the national values and concrete populations
at stake in such cases, they necessarily will avoid the instrumental
rationality that undermines the legitimacy of our legal system. Al-
though the loss of instrumental reasoning will probably have an
influence on the substantive outcome of the case, we should be less
interested in outcomes than methodology. Regardless of the ulti-
mate outcome in a case, it is important for a court to reason
thoughtfully and work diligently to produce cogent opinions where
affirmative action is at issue.
Of course, for some time now the legal literature has included
discussions of the constitutional significance of competing values
ment and failure results from economic factors unrelated to past discrimination).
248. The stress is on logic here since any consideration of race usually is viewed
as aberrational or evil in the jurisprudence and academic writing on race, where
Aristotelian symmetry is the goal. Removing ourselves mentally from the tradi-
tional legal jargon allows us to view demographic characteristics contextually, in
terms of their actual salience in everyday life.
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and interests. 49 Judges have been encouraged to divine the con-
stitutional significance of competing values by turning to reason,
tradition or neutral principles, for instance. 250 Judicial "interest
balancing" was a particularly strong component of the analytical
calculus in the school desegregation cases. 251
I do not mean to suggest continued reliance upon the modali-
ties of reasoning that have characterized judicial and academic
discussion of difficult sociopolitical issues heretofore, however. Far
too often, judges purporting to reason in these terms have sacri-
ficed the vision of equality espoused by those who historically have
existed on the margins of society.252 Nowhere was this more ap-
parent than in the school desegregation cases. 253
It is now clear that commitment to interest balancing alone
will not produce just results: substantive rules and interpretive
constructs may inform and mediate a judge's intention to consider
a multiplicity of interests such that doing so becomes vacuous, an
empty academic exercise. For instance, the interest balancing
principle that was common in jurisprudence during the heyday of
school desegregation litigation was wedded to a corrective theory
of justice that was often linked to inadequate remedies to obvi-
ously constitutionally impermissible conditions.254 The narrow
conception of causation embedded in the compensatory theory of
justice enables significant restrictions on the scope and duration of
remedial efforts. 255 This is a practical limitation of corrective jus-
249. See ELY, supra note 130, at 43-72.
250. See id. at 54-68; Fiss, supra note 245, at 120-22.
251. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 609-28 (1983).
252. See Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 666-70 (1985)
(discussing the problem of judicial insensitivity to "interests and values" of impor-
tant "subcultures" as demonstrated, for instance, in cases concerning indigence).
The traditional mode of reasoning about equal protection issues produces re-
sults consistent with the status quo because subjectivity inheres in it. Owen Fiss
addresses this problem:
The promise of value neutrality is only an illusion. On the explicit level,
the court must determine whether the state end is legitimate, which clas-
sifications are suspect, which rights are fundamental, which legitimate
state interests are compelling, and whether the occasion is a proper one
for invoking the one-step-at-a-time defense. On the implicit level, the
preferences of the judge enter the judicial process when he formulates the
imaginable state purposes and chooses among them, and also when he de-
cides whether the criterion is sufficiently ill-suited to warrant invalida-
tion-whether the right degree of fit is present.
Fiss, supra note 245, at 121.
253. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RAcISM AND AMERICAN LAw 544-85 (3d ed. 1992).
254. See Gewirtz, supra note 251, at 599-601 (discussing costs and rights maxi-
mizing in balancing interests).
255. See id. at 589-99; Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 732-33, 734.
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tice. A more fundamental flaw is structural in nature. While cor-
rective justice may reach patently unequal policies and practices
(e.g., state-mandated school segregation at the University of Texas
Law School, i.e., Sweatt v. Painter), it does not necessarily chal-
lenge practices or policies that are subordinating but not inten-
tionally discriminatory (e.g., "White flight"). 256  The matter dis-
cussed here-the potentially discriminatory effect of the TI and
the Hopwood court's uncritical acceptance of it nonetheless-falls
into this second category of unjust conditions.
In other words, the predominant conception of justice fails to
contemplate an inequality that has been characterized in this Arti-
cle as being of immense import. It is because of this logical and
moral lacuna that I suggest the embracing of a rationality that not
only rejects instrumentalism methodologically, but which incorpo-
rates material and social conditions into applicable rules and
norms.
This would be a functional interpretive scheme. Under it,
race would not be viewed one-dimensionally-not simply in terms
of a suspect class or as a category to which strict scrutiny is to be
rigidly applied. Rather, courts would interpret the Equal Protec-
tion Clause concretely, in terms of the groups described above, 257
and with affirmative recognition of the distributional claims upon
societal resources being made by various groups.258 Functional
analysis would require an inquiry as to facts that might mitigate
the most stringent application of the strict scrutiny standard.
A judge employing this mode of reasoning might consider
whether affirmative action in education is unique, as compared to
a firm's race-conscious hiring practices, for instance. In the event
that a principled distinction could or could not be made between
employment and education law, the strict scrutiny standard would
or would not be applied differently in these substantive areas. A
Solomonic alternative might be the most judicious approach: the
256. See Gewirtz, supra note 18, at 731-33, 752-53 (promoting consideration of
three elements--violation, linkage and limits--in constructing a remedy); Gewirtz,
supra note 251, at 628-37 (examining the causes, effects and significance of White
flight).
257. But cf. Fiss, supra note 245, at 129 (stating that the antidiscrimination
principle's inability to recognize social groups explains much of the aversion to af-
firmative action).
258. See Brest, supra note 252, at 669-70; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) (arguing that the
goal of modern constitutional doctrine is to prevent the distribution of resources or
opportunities to groups on the basis of raw political power). Though informative,
Sunstein's theory is too loyal to the political process theory to be consistent with
the modality of reasoning advocated in this Article.
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court could import some concepts and standards from the employ-
ment cases to the educational context, but not others. For exam-
ple, a court might decide to require uniform application of certain
standards for validation of ability testing that result in a racially
disparate impact on educational and employment opportunities.
On the other hand, a court might decide that it would be inappro-
priate to require identical standards of proof for claims brought
under Title VII and Title VI.259
In any event, the functional approach should lead courts to
consider empirical evidence about intellectual ability in a critical
light and make historically-informed, contextual judgments about
competing claims to educational access. The court that conceptu-
alizes educational affirmative action cases in terms of the totality
of available evidence about the social and material reality of af-
fected students would be of an altogether different mindset than
the court whose constitutional analysis is tripped up by racial dif-
ferences in LSAT scores. The court focused on broad, societal is-
sues is in a better position to avoid mechanical analysis when
evaluating affirmative action policies in education.
B. Contesting the Meaning of Real Racial Differences in
LSAT Scores
Hopwood also suggests that the real racial differences in ad-
missions indexes between White and non-White applicants deserve
careful consideration by advocates of educational opportunity. In
my judgment, universities have been able to downplay their use of
the "cold numbers" in admissions precisely because of affirmative
action policies. Affirmative action has been used effectively to cor-
rect for the well-documented pattern showing that African-
Americans and Latinos are systematically disadvantaged by use of
admissions indexes that rely heavily upon the LSAT's assessment
of ability.2 60
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, affirmative action
may be viewed as a conservative approach to dealing with issues of
social justice in education. For one could argue that a truly proac-
259. For a discussion of the implications of importing the disparate impact
analysis used in employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII to edu-
cation cases brought under Title VI, see Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Pub-
lic School Tracking, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1334-41 (1989).
260. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 26, at 956 ("[Ajffirmative action ... sup-
plements an underlying framework of selection that is implicitly arbitrary and ex-
clusionary. It does not challenge the overall operation of a conventional and static
selection process; instead, it creates exceptions to that process.").
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tive approach to remedying race-based inequalities in education
would require fundamental changes in policies and practices. 261
Truly equal opportunity might require reconstruction of testing
and application procedures, for instance, rather than band-aids
like policies that allow for admission of African-Americans and La-
tinos with lower test scores than Whites.
Ironically, then, the Hopwood decision may have helped to
create a more radical factual landscape upon which to consider
remedies for racial inequality in higher education in the future.
The viability of the band-aid approach to remedying racial injus-
tice in higher education has been predicated upon the legal and
political viability of affirmative action programs. Since both the
legal and political pendulums have swung decidedly against race-
based affirmative action,2 62 the stakes have been raised in the de-
bate over access to education. Questions about race and stan-
dardized representations of ability may now be resolved on terms
that beg socially transformative responses to racial inequality in
education rather than band-aid approaches. Whereas the LSAC's
cautionary policies previously have amounted to legalese with
which the formulator of the LSAT protects itself from liability,
Hopwood and the current political climate have set the stage for
groups disparately impacted by the use of LSAT to demand true
accountability from LSAC and law schools that rely upon the test
in admissions. The validity of the LSAT for measuring the apti-
tude of minority law school applicants will be a pivotal issue in fu-
ture preferential treatment cases.
In fact, the question is ripe for debate in the courts. Propo-
nents of equal access can challenge the validity of the LSAT in an
independent action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.263 A statistician's testimony as to the invalidity of the LSAT
261. Cf. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 63-65 (1993) (describing affirmative ac-
tion as a "compromise" measure rather than a "substantive redistributive meas-
ure[ ]"); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 26, at 956 (calling affirmative action an
"incrementalist strategy of inclusion").
262. In addition to the situation in Texas, an anti-affirmative action legislative
measure has been enacted by Californians. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wil-
son, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an initiative passed by the major-
ity of California's voters banning governmental use of race- or sex-based prefer-
ences in employment and admissions is not unconstitutional); see also Podberesky
v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1993) (finding
that the University of Maryland's scholarship program for African-Americans is an
unconstitutional racial preference). Since passage of the California initiative,
Black admissions to Berkeley and UCLA have dropped 80%, while admissions of
Hispanics have dropped 50% and 32%, respectively. See Gwynne, supra note 7, at
48.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
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for members of a protected racial class can be used to defend a re-
medial affirmative action policy that works to correct for the dis-
parate impact of its use upon African-American and Latino stu-
dents. 264
In the event of a legal challenge to the LSAT's disparate im-
pact on some groups of racial minorities, it is important to distin-
guish how different schools interpret and use test scores in their
admissions processes. A distinction should be made between use
of the test to weed out those students altogether unable to succeed
in law school, and use of the test to weed out lower from higher
scorers among the students who can attain passing grades in law
school. 265
Additionally, courts should be pressed to reconcile the doc-
trinal inconsistency in the way race-based differentials in ability
test scores are treated in employment and elementary and secon-
dary education law, with the way they are treated in higher educa-
tion law. 266 It is incumbent upon the courts to offer some princi-
pled basis for the dissimilar doctrinal approaches with respect to
the two bodies of law. Alternatively, courts can approach the issue
of ability testing in higher education in a manner consistent with
the approach taken in these other areas.
C. The Design of Educational Admissions Programs:
Toward Socially Responsible Usage of Quantitative
Variables Signifying Ability
University administrators and other formulators of educa-
tional policy, rather than advocates, are in the best position to
learn from Hopwood. These institutional gatekeepers should bear
in mind that universities may be held liable under Title VI for re-
lying upon quantitative criteria that disparately impact racial mi-
norities in admissions. More importantly, they can attempt to
make substantive changes in policy to ensure equal educational
opportunity before being sued.
Most law schools could achieve fundamental change by devel-
oping admissions procedures that explicitly allow for substantial
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
264. See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
265. See Simien, supra note 12, at 373-75; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 26, at
968-97.
266. See supra notes 139-157 and accompanying text (discussing education and
employment discrimination case law addressing standardized measurements of
ability).
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consideration of non-quantifiable indicia of academic success.
Since most admissions systems probably can be said to consist of
two broad categories of applicants-presumptive admits and those
who are not presumptive admits-most institutions already rely
substantially upon factors other than the "cold numbers" in mak-
ing admissions decisions. 267 Non-quantitative elements already
are taken into consideration not only with respect to students of
Color, but for all applicants. 268 Thus, this author only suggests
that written policies reflect reality.
In any event, administrative convenience is an insufficient
rationale for using admissions criteria that deny access to histori-
cally subordinated groups. 269 Even assuming that test scores are
useful to some degree, it seems untenable that testing practices
that perpetuate inequality should be as pervasive as they are in
contemporary society. Thus, policy makers should generally re-
consider the great extent to which standardized tests determine
which students gain access to higher education, especially the law
schools.
Conclusion
Moral reasoning requires courts to consider the nation's so-
cial problems and the social meaning of legal rulings in all their
complexity. While it may seem easier in the short term to neglect
nuance, such an analytical approach does not constitute a juris-
prudence of integrity. Nowhere is judicious reasoning more impor-
tant than when courts formulate rules that affect how educational
resources are distributed, for schools are sites where the histories,
perspectives and subjectivity of groups and individual students are
made most meaningful. Given the significance of higher education
to an individual's long-term prospects, it is crucial that courts
scrutinize any process that threatens access to schooling for all.
There should be no exception to this rule for conceptions of ability
that are held out as scientific in nature. Standardized testing poli-
cies are not above the law.
Giving due consideration to the social context in which educa-
tional issues are adjudicated, then, let no other court follow the
example of the Fifth Circuit in the Hopwood opinion. If dramatic
267. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Sturm & Guinier, supra note 26, at 988-1009 (discussing the sali-
ence of socioeconomic factors to the higher education admissions process); see also
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
269. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
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change is to be mandated by a court, it is incumbent upon that
court to privately formulate and then present to the public an
opinion that thoroughly explains why a break with precedent is
the appropriate outcome and preferred alternative among the
many that the law allows. In this way, the legitimacy of the judi-
cial process is more likely to be preserved and just results more
likely to be achieved.
Law and Inequality
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DECLARATION OF MARTIN M. SHAPIRO
MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, pursuant to penalty of perjury under
28 U.S.C. § 1746, does hereby state the following:
1. My name is Martin M. Shapiro. I am more than twenty-
one years of age, and am under no legal disability of any kind.
This declaration is given in connection with the above styled ac-
tion.
2. I hold the position of Professor of Psychology at Emory
University, Atlanta, Georgia. I have taught courses in statistics,
experimental design, and psychological tests and measurements
for approximately thirty-five years. I received a Ph.D. degree from
Indiana University with concentrations in Psychology and Mathe-
matics and have published statistical papers in learned journals
and other books.
3. I have testified before legislative committees in New York,
Wisconsin and California regarding the validity of the standard-
ized admissions examinations currently used in colleges, graduate
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schools and professional schools. I have served as a member of the
New York State Advisory Committee for Bias in Standardized
Testing, which was charged by the state legislature with the task
of studying and submitting a report on possible racial/ethnic bias
in standardized admissions examinations, including, inter alia, the
Law School Admission Test.
4. I have testified as an expert witness in statistics and test
validation in the United States District Courts in Arkansas, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Tennessee, and Texas.
5. A copy of my Vita is attached to this declaration.
6. I have reviewed various documents describing the admis-
sions procedures, the criteria employed, and the numerical results
of the admission process at the University of Texas School of Law.
In addition to my own education, training and experience in the
areas of testing and statistics, I specifically relied upon the fol-
lowing documents for information regarding the admissions proce-
dures and criteria utilized by the University of Texas School of
Law:
Memorandum, dated December 15, 1987, to President Wil-
ham H. Cunningham and the Executive Officers of the University
of Texas at Austin, from Dean Mark G. Yudof, Re: School of Law
Admission Procedures. (Yudof Deposition Exhibit M-81),
Memorandum, dated October 3, 1991, to Mark Yudof, from-
Mike Sharlot, Re: Minority admissions and credentials, 1983-91.
(Yudof Deposition Exhibit M-86),
Memorandum, dated November 1, 1985, to Admissions Com-
mittee, from Mark G. Yudof, Re: Admission Standards and Proce-
dures for 1986 Entering Class. (Johanson Deposition Exhibit
MSO),
Memorandum with INDEX FORMULA SELECTION FORM
FOR 1991-92 LSDAS REPORTS and INDEX FORMULA
SELECTION FORM FOR 1992-93 LSDAS REPORTS attached,
dated Thursday, May 18, 1992, to Admissions Committee, cc:
Dean Yudof, from Stanley Johanson, Chairman, Admissions
Committee, Re: Proposed Revisions of Texas Index Formula.
(Johanson Deposition Exhibit M33),
Memorandum, dated June 8, 1992, from University of Texas
School of Law (6882), to Law School Admission Services, with an
attached Law School Admission Services
MEMORANDUM, dated May 8, 1991, to Law School Admis-
sions Officers, from Robert Carr, Assistant Vice-president, Data
Services, Subject: LSDAS Report Data - Index Calculations. (Pages
labeled D00595 to D 00598), and Law School Admission Services
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MEMORANDUM, dated May 17, 1991, to Law School Admis-
sions officers, from Robert Carr, Assistant Vice-president, Data
Services, Subject: LSDAS Report Data - Index Calculations. (Pages
labeled D 00601 to D 00603).
7. I also have reviewed two Law School Admission Services
regression analyses, discussed in §§ 16-25 and §§ 26-33, respec-
tively, infra, pertaining to the differential validity of the admission
procedures used at the University of Texas School of Law, Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin (hereinafter, referred to as the Law School).
Subsequently, I additionally requested, through counsel for the
Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Associa-
tion, the raw data underlying the publicly available analyses, ex-
cluding any individual identifying information, but was informed
that the Law School could not provide these data. Consequently,
my observations and opinions, as contained in this declaration,
necessarily will be based on analyses performed by others. Al-
though I would have preferred to have carried out my own calcula-
tions and might have been able to have reached even more defini-
tive conclusions based upon additional analyses of the raw data, I
am fully confident that the inferences which I have drawn from
the Law School Admission Services' published results are valid. I
shall limit my observations and opinions to the validity of the ad-
mission procedures as they are applied to White and African
American applicants. Specifically, I have concluded (1) that the
regression analysis results obtained by the Law School Admission
Services conclusively demonstrate that the selection criteria which
the Law School has used to evaluate African American applicants
were invalid, (2) that the Texas Index should not have been used
as an initial sorting criterion for African American applicants, but
(3) that the practice of reducing the numerical values of the Texas
Index required of African American applicants had, at least some,
ameliorative effect upon the invalid application of the Texas Index.
THE TEXAS INDEX
8. The Law School, like almost every college and professional
school in the United States, uses a statistical technique for esti-
mating the relationship between two or more measures (for exam-
ple, the Law School Admission Test score, undergraduate grade-
point average and first-year law school grade-point average) to de-
velop criteria for making its preliminary admissions decisions.
This statistical technique is called a "linear regression equation"
and the equation is almost always of the following form:
PREDICTED FIRST-YEAR GRADE-POINT AVERAGE =
(TEST WEIGHT) X (ADMISSIONS TEST SCORE) + (GRADE
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WEIGHT) X (PREVIOUS GRADE-POINT AVERAGE) +
CONSTANT.
By using a linear regression equation to analyze the relation-
ship between first-year grade-point averages and (a) the Law
School Admission Test score and (b) the undergraduate grade-
point average for the group of students whom it admitted in a pre-
vious year, a law school develops a formula based upon which it
predicts how well a prospective student is likely to do in the first
year of law school if the school decides to admit him or her. The
linear regression equation produces a formula that tells the school
how much weight to give each measure (for instance, admission
test score and undergraduate grade-point average).
9. The values of the weights used in evaluating applicants
are determined by a least-squares method which minimizes the
squared deviations between predicted first-year grades and actu-
ally observed first-year grades of students admitted in previous
years. Mathematicians and statisticians, by generally accepted
convention, define a "best-fitting" line as a regression equation de-
rived by a least-squares method. That is, a regression equation is
a mathematical method of obtaining the "best" estimate of the re-
lationship between a set of variables in this case, the Law School
Admission Test score, the undergraduate grade-point average and
first-year law school grades. A "linear" regression equation de-
scribes the best-fitting straight line which portrays the relation-
ship between two variables. A linear "multiple" regression equa-
tion for three variables describes the best-fitting three-dimensional
plane which portrays the relationship between those three vari-
ables. The linear multiple-regression equation does, with exact
precision and for any number of variables, what a person can do
visually for two variables by drawing a line that seems to fit a
small set of points on a graph produced by a limited number of ob-
servations. In the case of almost all law schools, the task of calcu-
lating the weights for the linear multiple-regression equation is
performed by the Law School Admission Services, Inc., which pro-
vides each school with the values of the least-squares weights to be
given the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Undergraduate
Grade-Point Average (UGPA) and the CONSTANT.
10. The weights, as determined by the Law School Admission
Services, Inc., are calculated without reference to race or ethnicity
of the first-year students and the same set of weights is employed
in calculating the predicted first-year grade-point average for each
subsequent applicant. The relationships between the individual
predictor variables (LSAT and UGPA) and the criterion variable
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(actual first-year grade-point average) can be shown graphically,
in which case the weight which serves as multiplier for either the
LSAT or the UGPA is pictured as the slope of the regression line
and the CONSTANT is portrayed as the intercept point at which
the regression line crosses the vertical axis (ordinate) of the graph.
11. The Law School referred to its least-squares regression
equation which predicted first-year performance as the Texas In-
dex. To evaluate 1991 applicants, when LSAT scores ranged from
10 to 48 and the UGPA ranged from 0.00 to 4.33, the Law School
assigned a weight of 1.00 to the LSAT, a weight of 10.00 to the
UGPA and a weight of 0.00 to the CONSTANT. To evaluate 1992
applicants, the Law School assigned weights of 1.25, 10.00 and
0.00, respectively. That is, for each Fall, 1991 applicant, Texas In-
dex = LSAT + (10)(UGPA). Similarly, for each Fall, 1992 appli-
cant, Texas Index = (1.25)(LSAT) + (10)(UGPA). The Texas Index
is described in the Memorandum previously identified as Johanson
Deposition Exhibit M33, dated Thursday, May 18, 1992, and cited
in § 6, supra.
12. Considering that the highest possible LSAT score is
somewhat more than ten times the highest possible UGPA, the ef-
fect of these weightings is to attach somewhat more importance to
the LSAT than the UGPA. See, Memorandum with INDEX
FORMULA SELECTION FORM FOR 1991-92 LSDAS REPORTS
and INDEX FORMULA SELECTION FORM FOR 1992-93 LSDAS
REPORTS attached, dated Thursday, May 18, 1992, (Johanson
Deposition Exhibit M33) cited in § 6, supra. The Law School esti-
mated the weightings to be equivalent to placing approximately
55-65% importance on the LSAT and approximately 35-45% impor-
tance on the UGPA. (These percentages are only crude estimates.
An accurate comparison of relative weights requires the calcula-
tion of standardized weights, also called beta-weights. The beta-
weights were not contained in the documents and analyses avail-
able to me.)
13. As indicated in Johanson Deposition Exhibit M33, the
equation, Texas Index = (1.25)(LSAT) + (10)(UGPA), potentially
generated Texas Index values from 33 to 103 (for applicants sub-
mitting LSAT scores expressed in two-digit values) and from 140
to 223 (for applicants submitting LSAT scores expressed in three-
digit values), and served as the sole basis for initially sorting the
large number of applications into the three categories of presump-
tive acceptance, discretionary zone, and presumptive denial.
(These terms, as used to describe the three categories into which
applicants were initially sorted, are misleading because all three
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categories were subject to a subsequent discretionary re-
evaluation, as described in § 15, infra.)
14. In practice, the applications were first divided into sepa-
rate sets based upon state residency and race/ethnicity. The val-
ues of the Texas Index required for initial assignment into the
three categories differed for Texas residents and non-residents;
likewise, the values of the Texas Index required for initial assign-
ment into the three categories differed for African Ameri-
canlMexican American and other applicants.
15. All applications were, to some greater or lesser extent,
evaluated more thoroughly after the initial sorting and prior to a
final decision, less extensive evaluation being given to applications
with the highest and lowest Texas Indices within each residency
and ethnic/race group and more extensive evaluation being given
to applications with middling Texas Indices within each residency
and ethnic/race group.
THE CONCEPT OF TEST VALIDATION
16. The Law School Admission Services, Inc., the publisher of
the LSAT, has published a summary of the results from studies of
the validity of regression equations predicting first-year law school
grade-point averages based upon weightings of the LSAT and the
UGPA at 167 participating law schools in the United States and
Canada. Linda F. Wightman, Predictive Validity of the LSAT: A
National Summary of the 1990-1992 Correlation Studies, Law
School Admission Council Research Report 93-05, December 1993
(hereinafter, referred to as Predictive Validity). This document
was introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibit 136.
17. A correlation coefficient describes the degree of co-
relationship between variables. The correlation coefficient is used
to describe the co-relationship between the actual first-year grade-
point average of each student and the predicted first-year grade-
point average of each student, where the predicted average had
been generated by the linear regression equation based upon the
weighted LSAT and the weighted UGPA.
18. In describing the co-relationship between two variables, a
positive correlation coefficient signifies that the two variables
move concurrently in the same direction; for example, students
who have higher predicted first-year grade-point averages also
have higher actual first-year grade-point averages, or students
who have higher LSAT scores also have higher actual grade-point
averages in law school, or students who have higher UGPAs also
have higher actual first-year grade-point averages in law school.
Conversely, in describing the co-relationship between two vari-
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ables, a negative correlation coefficient signifies that the two vari-
able move in opposite directions; for example, higher predicted
first-year grade-point averages are associated with lower actual
first-year grade-point averages, or higher LSATs are associated
with lower grades in the first year of law school or higher UGPAs
are associated with lower grades in the first year of law school.
However, positive or negative direction cannot be attributed to
multiple correlation coefficients which describe the relationships
among three or more variables because the component pair-wise
relationships may not all be in the same direction. The direction of
the co-relationship between any one of the individual predictor
variables and the criterion variable can be ascertained from the
positive or negative sign attributed to the regression weight asso-
ciated with the particular predictor variable.
19. The greater the positive correlation between LSAT and
actual first-year grades, UGPA and actual first-year grades, and
predicted first-year grade-point average and actual first-year
grades, the more valid are these predictors of first-year law school
grades. For the weighted regression equation to be a valid admis-
sion tool, the predicted grade-point average must be positively cor-
related with the actual grade-point average, and furthermore, the
two individual predictors, LSAT and UGPA, must be positively
correlated with actual grade-point average.
20. It has been reported that the average correlation between
predicted grade-point average and actual grade-point average at
the participating law schools is +0.49. Predictive Validity, Table 2,
at p. 10. The square of a correlation coefficient is equal to the pro-
portion of variance in one of the variables which is accounted for
by the other variable. Therefore, a correlation coefficient of 0.49
signifies that approximately 25% of the variance among actual
first-year grade-point averages is accounted for by the regression
equation which predicts first-year grade-point average.
21. Although an average correlation of +0.49 with first-year
grades arguably is a reasonable correlation from which to infer
that a regression equation is a valid admission tool at the average
law school, the inference may not hold for any particular law
school. "One observation of note from the data in Table 2 is that
the range of correlation coefficients for any of the prediction mod-
els varies substantially from law school to law school." Predictive
Validity, at p. 18.
22. An inquiry regarding the validity of the regression equa-
tion must be specific to any given school, in the instant case, the
University of Texas School of Law. Furthermore, if sufficiently
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large numbers of students exist within distinct racial/ethnic
groups, it is required professional psychometric practice to investi-
gate the validity of the regression equation for each of the separate
racial/ethnic groups.
23. "The possibility that differential prediction exists in edu-
cational selection for selected groups should be investigated where
there is prior evidence to suggest that positive results may be
found and where sample sizes are adequate." Standards for Edu-
cational and Psychological Testing, American Psychological Asso-
ciation, Standard 8.10, at p. 53 (hereinafter, referred to as APA
Standards).
24. "Differential prediction is a broad concept that includes
the possibility that different prediction equations may be obtained
for different demographic groups, for groups that differ in their
prior experiences, or for groups that receive different treatments
or are involved in different instructional programs." APA Stan-
dards, at p. 12.
25. "The accepted technical definition of predictive bias im-
plies that no bias exists if the predictive relationship of two groups
being compared can be adequately described by a common algo-
rithm (e.g., regression line). In the simple regression analysis for
selection using one predictor, selection bias is investigated by
judging whether the regressions differ among identifiable groups
in the population. If different regression slopes, intercepts, or
standard errors of estimate are found among different groups, se-
lection decisions will be biased when the same interpretation is
made of a given score without regard to the group from which a
person comes. Differing regression slopes or intercepts are taken
to indicate that a test is differentially predictive for the groups at
hand." APA Standards, at pp. 12-13. Predictive bias is an impor-
tant form of selection procedure invalidity.
A VALIDITY STUDY OF THE TEXAS INDEX
26. The Law School Admission Services, Inc., the publisher of
the LSAT, also has published a set of results from studies of the
validity of regression equations predicting first-year law school
grade-point average based upon weightings of the LSAT and the
UGPA, separately for White students and for African American
students, at 51 participating law schools covering the entering law
school classes of 1986, 1987 and 1988. Linda F. Wightman and D.
G. Muller, An Analysis of Differential Validity and Differential
Prediction for Black, Mexican American, Hispanic, and White Law
School Students, Law School Admission Council Research Report
93-03, June 1990 (hereinafter, referred to as Differential Validity).
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This document was presented at trial as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 137.
The results of the analyses are presented for each of the partici-
pating law schools. The University of Texas School of Law ap-
peared to be coded as school number 49 and this identification was
confirmed through counsel for the Thurgood Marshall Legal Soci-
ety and the Black Pre-Law Association, by counsel for the Law
School.
27. In their Executive Summary, the authors of this Predic-
tive Validity study conclude that the regression equations are valid
predictors. "The validity data do not support the concern that the
LSAT score or the traditional combination of LSAT score and un-
dergraduate grade-point average are less valid for any of the mi-
nority groups than they are for the White group." Predictive Va-
lidity, at p. 1. However, it shall be demonstrated, infra, that this
conclusion is not applicable to the University of Texas School of
Law, for which the use of the regression equation is invalid for the
African American students.
28. The authors give the following basis for their conclusion:
"Separate regression systems are developed for each of the
three minority groups and are compared with a regression system
based on White students from the same institution to determine
the reasonableness of using a single equation based on the combi-
nation of the two groups. If the slopes, intercepts, and prediction
errors are the same for the two separate regression systems, the
data can be combined and a single prediction equation can be used
for the total group. The results of these tests show few significant
differences in slopes between the two groups, but a substantial
number of differences in standard errors of estimate and in inter-
cepts. As was true for the earlier studies on this topic, the predic-
tion bias that is a consequence of significantly different slopes and
intercepts does not fit the traditional definition of prediction bias.
That is, when differences in slope are observed, the differences
tend to be greater for the White students than for minority, stu-
dents. Likewise, in the majority of cases, the intercept for White
students is larger than the intercept for minority students."
Differential Validity, at p. 1. The crux of the authors' argu-
ment is that there are "few" statistically significant differences in
slope and intercept, and that these few differences do not disfavor
minority students. However, this conclusion is not applicable to
the University of Texas School of Law, for which the use of the re-
gression equation is invalid for the African American students.
29. The results of the analyses for the University of Texas
School of Law reported in Differential Validity, using the regres-
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sion model which predicts first-year grade-point average (FYA)
based upon the LSAT and UGPA in combination with each other
for each racial group separately, are as follows:
SOURCE STATISTIC WHITE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN
Table 2 Number of Students 1500 59
Table 6 Mean LSAT 39.6 31.2
Table 6 Mean UGPA 3.5 3.0
Table 6 Mean FYA (on a transformed 52.0 36.6
scale)
Table 7 Correlation(r) LSAT with FYA +0.24 +0.25
Table 7 Correlation(r) UGPA with FYA +0.16 -0.23
Table 7 Multiple Corr(r) LSAT, UGPA 0.35 0.28*
with FYA
Table 10 Regression Weight of LSAT 0.93 0.36
Table 10 Regression Weight of UGPA +7.94 -3.35
Table 10 Intercept -12.78 +35.39
*note that the African American multiple correlation coeffi-
cient equal to 0.28 is the result of a positive regression weight as-
sociated with LSAT and a negative regression weight associated
with UGPA
30. An inspection of the statistics reproduced in § 29, supra,
reveals that the multiple correlation between the first-year grade-
point average predicted by the combination of LSAT and UGPA
with the actual FYA is rather poor for African American students,
0.28. A multiple correlation of 0.28 corresponds to the finding that
only 8% (0.28-squared) of the variance in the actual FYAs of Afri-
can American students is accounted for by the multiple regression
equation which predicts FYA from LSAT and UGPA.
31. Of even greater import, the multiple correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.28 for African American students is achieved only if the
UGPA of each African American student is multiplied by a weight
equal to -3.35. That is, for African American students, this small
8% predictability is achieved only if lower undergraduate grade-
point averages are made to predict higher first-year averages in
the Law School. It is not reasonable that the Law School, based on
this regression equation, would select the African American appli-
cants with the worst undergraduate grade-point averages over the
African American applicants with the best undergraduate grade-
point averages. "Validity is the most important consideration in
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test evaluation. The concept refers to the appropriateness, mean-
ingfulness, and usefulness of the specific inferences made from test
scores. Test validation is the process of accumulating evidence to
support such inferences. A variety of inferences may be made
from scores produced by a given test, and there are many ways of
accumulating evidence to support any given inference. Validity,
however, is a unitary concept. Although evidence may be accu-
mulated in many ways, validity always refers to the degree to
which that evidence supports the inferences that are made from
the scores. The inferences regarding specific uses of a test are
validated, not the test itself."
APA Standards, at p.9. Consequently, a selection procedure
based upon a regression equation which would predict first-year
grade point average equal to +35.39 + 0.36 LSAT - 3.35 UGPA can
not be a valid selection procedure.
32. Furthermore, the regression equations for the White and
African American students at the Law School have statistically
significantly different slopes (regression weights) and intercepts.
Differential Validity, Table 12, at p. 18. An admission process
which applied the same Texas Index equation to all applicants
would create predictive bias. See § 25, supra, for the technical
definition of predictive bias.
33. The authors note, more generally, that the results of the
tests of statistical significance "fail to confirm that the regression
systems are identical for each group (minority and nonminority) at
each school, [but that] the regressions estimated from the com-
bined data are most similar to the ones that are most frequently
used by the majority of law schools. Clearly, if data support the
need to rely on separate regression systems, they easily could be
produced when sample sizes are sufficiently large." Differential
Validity, at p. 19.
PRACTICAL EFFECT OF LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
PROCESS
34. The professionally acceptable method of dealing with a
finding of differential prediction is to use separate regression
equations for the groups whose regression equations statistically
significantly differ from each other in slope or intercept, as cor-
rectly suggested by the authors of Differential Validity, quoted in §
33, supra. However, the use of separate regression equations
would not have been feasible at the University of Texas School of
Law. The regression equation for the African American applicants
would have required the absurd result that, everything else held
constant, African American students with lower UGPAs be pre-
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sumptively accepted over African American students with higher
UGPAS.
35. The best, most valid, procedure would have been to
eliminate the use of the Texas Index as an initial sorting criterion
for the African American applicants and to proceed directly to the
more extensive evaluation and review of the applications. Neither
equation, Texas Index = (1.00)(LSAT) + (10)(UGPA) for the 1991
entering class or Texas Index = (1.25)(LSAT) + (10)(UGPA) for the
1992 entering class, had any predictive validity with respect to the
African American applications. See § 25, supra.
36. Instead of eliminating the use of the Texas Index for Af-
rican American applicants, the Law School lowered the required
Texas Index values for the initial sorting of the African American
applicants. The effect was to reduce the number of African Ameri-
can applicants who would have been invalidly presumptively de-
nied admission.
37. Eliminating the use of the Texas Index for African
American applicants would have had greater validity than lower-
ing the required Texas Index values for African American appli-
cants. However, lowering the required values did improve the va-
lidity of the admission process by reducing the number of
presumptive denials. The lowering of the required Texas Index
values for the African American applicants at least partially ame-
liorated the invalid preclusive effect of the Texas Index.
38. On the other hand, the least valid procedure would have
been to initially sort all applicants by applying the same required
Texas Index values to both White and African American appli-
cants. The consequence of applying the same Texas Index re-
quirements to both White and African American applicants would
have been to eliminate almost all African American applicants,
generally, and to eliminate many or all of the most qualified Afri-
can American applicants, specifically.
I verify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.
MARTIN M. SHAPIRO
Executed on this 3rd day of June, 1994.

